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The failures of the Scanian War of 1675-1679 revealed to a young Karl XI that 
Sweden’s military was in dire need of reform. This thesis follows the king’s process of 
negotiating with the peasantry over the implementation of one of these new reforms, the 
knekthåll system for recruiting infantry. It argues that Karl XI intentionally used 
negotiation as an instrument to build a more efficient method of military recruitment and 
maintenance. That he used negotiation as a tool to adapt to diverse localities and align the 
requirements of the knekthåll system with the real resources of an area. Negotiation 
legitimized the king’s resource extraction even as it provided him with information on the 
resources of a locality and the peasant’s willingness to part with them. Through this 
alignment the system gained stability, and with that long-term efficiency. Negotiation 
was not the last recourse of a king not powerful enough to enforce his will, but a tool 
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List of non-English terms  
 
härad. A district. A small administrative division in the kingdom of Sweden. In general, a län would 
contain multiple härad. 
 
indelningsverk. A system of permanent allocation of fixed revenues to specific expenditures, such as 
schools, hospitals, or components of the military.  
 
knekthåll. A system for maintaining infantry soldiers organized under contract with peasants in different 
localities to maintain permanently a regiment of a certain strength.   
 
kungliga råd. The king’s council. Karl XI changed the name of the riksråd to kungliga råd as part of his 
subordination of the riksråd. 
 
landshövding. pl. landshövdingar. The governor of a län and the highest level of local administrator 
directly below the king.  
 
landskap. The old primary administrative unit of the kingdom of Sweden, replaced by the län in 1634. 
They continued to exist as important geographic divisions in the kingdom.  
 
lega. In the knekthåll system, this term referred to an enlistment bonus negotiated between the recruit and 
the rota. However, under the older utskrivning system this was an amount a conscripted peasant 
would pay to a substitute. 
 
län. A county. The primary administrative unit for governance in the kingdom of Sweden. There were often 
several counties in a province, though this varied across the kingdom. Supervising each län was a 
landshövding. 
 
mantal. A unit of measuring the tax value of land theoretically equivalent to a single farm able to support a 
farmer, his family, and servants.  
 
reduktion. A legal process of reclaiming former crown lands that previous Swedish monarchs had donated 
to the nobility.   
 
riksdag. The Swedish diet. The Riksdag was a meeting of representatives from the four estates, the 
nobility, the clergy, the towns, and the peasantry, where Swedish monarchs could air policy and 
laws to gain the estates’ approval. 
 
riksråd. The Swedish council of the realm. The Council was a body of aristocrats that acted as the king’s 
advisors and was the central executive body in the administration of the kingdom. Karl XI 
replaced the riksråd with the kungliga råd. 
 
rota. The peasants under a knekthåll contract formed a group called a rota, with each rota having the 
responsibility to recruit and support a single soldier. A rota would generally provide their soldier 






rusthåll. Similar to under the knekthåll, an individual wealthy peasant that undertook the rusthåll would 
permanently maintain a cavalry trooper. This peasant would sign a contract with the king directly 
and agreed to provide the trooper with housing, a horse, and equipment in return for a substantial 
tax exemption.   
 
rusttjänst. Medieval knight service.  
 
socken. pl. socknar. A parish. In addition to its church functions, the parish in Sweden was a small 
administrative unit with its own role in local governance. 
 
stämma. A local assembly. 
 
ståthållare. A steward. A lower level member of local administration.  
 
stormaktstid. Sweden’s age of greatness. 
 
thing. A public assembly where the people of an area settled legal disputes and made political decisions. 
The concept of the thing originated in the Viking Age but has lived on in Scandinavia into the 
present day.  
 
uppbåd. A militia levy called up from the peasantry.  
 
utskrivning. A conscription system based on dividing the peasantry into groups, generally of ten men, one 
of whom would become the conscript.  
 
värvning. Voluntary recruitment to the army, not via the knekthåll or rusthåll.   
 
åtting. pl. åttingar. An administrative division in the kingdom of Sweden, an eighth of a härad. 
 





d. kmt               daler kopparmynt  
 
d. smt                daler silvermynt  
 
m. smt               mark silvermynt  
 
 
Currencies referred to in the text 
 
In Sweden in the seventeenth century, there were two main types of domestic currencies in use, the daler 
kopparmynt and the daler silvermynt. There were four mark in a daler and one daler silvermynt (d. smt) 
had a set exchange rate of one for every three daler kopparmynt (d. kmt). As d. smt was a money of 
account in theory there were only lower denominations of silver coinage in circulation. In practice 
however, Gresham’s law was in full effect and these silver coins were not circulating. This left the public to 
trade with commodities or smaller denominations of copper coinage. Larger denominations of copper 
coinage were prohibitively heavy to try to balance their value with their supposed silver equivalents: hence, 










As with most of Protestant Europe, Sweden was still using the Julian, old style, calendar in the late 
seventeenth century and not the New Style, Gregorian calendar. All dates in the text are rendered in their 






On December 11, 1718, Karl XII (r. 1697-1718) died of a gunshot wound to the 
head during the siege of Fredriksten fortress in Norway. With his death, the Swedish 
empire would soon die too. The empire that so suddenly sprang to great power status a 
hundred years before had begun its terminal decline. Encircled by powerful adversaries 
and stricken by a lack of vital resources, Sweden had fought desperately to survive. 
Sweden had built its dominance through effective administration, the genius of its 
leaders, and strength of arms. By efficiently using the organs of the state, the kingdom 
was able to maximize the resources of war - men and money - surpassing even its larger 
rivals. For a long and bloody century, since Gustavus Adolphus (r. 1611-32) dramatically 
brought Sweden into the Thirty Years’ War and onto the European stage, Sweden was a 
great power. This age of Swedish empire, named the stormaktstid, the “age of greatness,” 
began with Erik XIV (r. 1560-68), when he gained control of the province of Estland in 
1560. Gustavus Adolphus continued to expand Swedish control, adding, amongst other 
territories, Livonia, Hamburg, and Bremen. The empire reached its height in 1660 during 
the reign of Karl X Gustav (r. 1654-60). At its apogee, Sweden’s Baltic empire controlled 






 With an empire now stretching around the Baltic, Sweden 
established itself as the most powerful kingdom in northeastern Europe.  
This rise to great power status was nothing less than meteoric. Gustav Vasa, the 
first king of Sweden after the kingdom had won its independence from the Danish-led 
Kalmar Union, had taken the throne a hundred years before Gustavus Adolphus. 
Sweden’s survival at this stage was by no means certain, and Gustav Vasa’s sons and 
successors, Erik XIV, Johan III (r. 1568-92), and Karl IX (r. 1604-11) would all find 
themselves struggling to maintain their kingdom’s existence. That changed with 
Sweden’s stunning success and expansion in the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War. In a 
hundred years, Sweden had moved from a poor, cultural backwater, on the fringes of 
Europe, to an empire that was now a major player on the European stage.  
The partnership between Gustavus Adolphus and the nobility, the Riksråd 
(Council), and the Riksdag (Swedish diet) made possible Sweden’s victories in the Thirty 
Years’ War. Through working closely with the four estates of the Riksdag (the nobility, 
the clergy, the towns, and the peasantry) as well as the Council, Gustavus Adolphus was 
able to forge consensus around his administrative reforms and foreign policy. The king’s 
use of the Riksdag as a means of building public support and legitimizing policy and laws 
was not new. Gustav Vasa, to a large degree, created the institution out of old medieval 
traditions to do such a thing. Unlike other early modern representative assemblies, the 
Riksdag included the peasantry as an equal body to the other three estates, with each 
estate holding a single vote. The Riksdag’s power was in its ability to approve laws as 
well as additional grants of taxation and conscription. While the body could not propose 
                                                             
1. At the end of the Thirty Years’ War, by land area, Sweden controlled the third-largest territory 




laws, as that was the king’s prerogative, it acted as a forum for the estates to weigh in on 
the king’s policy and modify its final form before approving it. The coronation charter of 
Gustavus Adolphus in 1611 along with the Form of Government of 1634 set the basic 
parameters of the Swedish government until the reign of Karl XI. The charter affirmed 
the Riksdag’s power to set and change law, while also laying out the specific privileges 
and power of the nobility and the Council, the bastion of aristocratic power in the 
government. The Council became a standing body of full time administrators and was the 
central administrative executive in the kingdom. Leading the Council were the heads of 
the five most important “colleges,” or ministries, the High Court, the War College, the 
Admiralty, the Chancery, and the Chamber. Historically, the Council was a strong body 
that could and often would oppose the king, and with the coronation charter they sought 
to protect their influence into the future. To that end, the Council, through the coronation 
charter, imposed on the king the duty to seek their advice and consent on matters of 
policy, both foreign and domestic.  
After the death of Gustavus Adolphus at the battle of Lützen (1632), the regency 
for the young Queen Christina was a period of growing noble power and wealth. The 
nobility, particularly the aristocracy, grew rich off the spoils of foreign wars. At the same 
time, the nobility were gaining more of the wealth of Sweden itself as the Queen 
alienated - “selling” to the nobility - an increasing amount of royal land. While the reign 
of Karl X Gustav was one of partnership between the crown and nobility, there was a 
conflict brewing between the two that did not reach fruition in the king’s lifetime. After 
Karl X Gustav’s death, the Council set out to counter what they saw as growing royal 




proposed by Karl X Gustav, and with the approval of the Riksdag, instead established a 
regency government that put the Council in a preeminent position. The Council had 
achieved its goal of emancipating itself from royal power and embarked on its own path. 
But Sweden faced mounting problems long in the making, and the Council’s policy to 
address this challenge was one that would eventually culminate in the disastrous Scanian 
War (1676-79). 
As powerful as Sweden had become, the Scanian War showed to the young Karl 
XI (r. 1660-97) that Sweden’s military might, the core of its power, did not rest on firm 
foundations. Karl XI had inherited not just the empire his father, Karl X Gustav, had 
brought to new heights, but a Swedish method of making war that on a financial level 
was dangerously unsustainable. Sweden was a state that had to be at war to remain in the 
black. The old system began to unravel when Karl X Gustav died in 1660 and a regency 
council started to rule in place of the four-year-old Karl XI. To finance the Swedish 
military the regency adopted a policy of seeking subsidies from France, money that 




In December 1674, at the behest of the French, the Swedish army invaded 
Brandenburg. Within a year Brandenburgers, Danes, and Austrians occupied much of 
Sweden’s German territories. In June 1676, the Danes invaded the historically Danish 
                                                             
2. Sweden’s foreign policy had long used diplomacy to secure foreign subsidies and alliances to 
overcome the kingdom’s inability to support its foreign policy ends with the means at its disposal. France 
was Sweden’s foremost paymaster in this regard, see Svante Norrhem, Mercenary Swedes: French 
Subsidies to Sweden, 1631-1796 (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2019). For a concise history of Sweden’s 
foreign policy and its fundamental connections with the resource issues of the Swedish empire in this 
period, see Sven Lundkvist, “The Experience of Empire: Sweden as a Great Power,” in Sweden’s Age of 
Greatness, 1632-1718, ed. Michael Roberts (New York: St Martin’s, 1973), 29-39. For a more detailed 
look at Sweden’s foreign policy during the Swedish empire, see Georg Landberg, Den Svenska 




provinces of Skåne, Blekinge, and Halland, taken from Denmark in 1658 by Karl X 
Gustav. Sweden faced repeated defeat on land and at sea. In Skåne, only the city of 
Malmö remained under Swedish control. A young Karl XI would personally lead the 
response, winning victories at the Battle of Lund (1676) and at the Battle of Landskrona 
(1677), breaking Danish morale and eventually culminating in the retreat of the Danish 
army from Sweden in July 1678. This resurgence of Swedish arms was not the 
mechanism that ended the war, rather it was the diplomatic might of Louis XIV 
intervening for his ally that assured the return of all of Sweden’s lost German territories 
in the Treaty of Fontainebleau on August 23, 1679. 
The Scanian War made apparent to Karl XI the dangerous weakness of the 
Swedish system. On the military front, once cut off from the vital mercenary recruiting 
grounds of Germany, Sweden had to rely on its old method of conscription, utskrivning. 
This was simply not sufficient to provide the manpower Sweden needed. On the financial 
front, the weakness of Sweden was even more apparent. Without the ability to occupy 
foreign territory and systematically plunder it of resources, the “contribution system” of 
Gustavus Adolphus, Sweden could not afford to keep a modern mercenary army even if it 
could recruit it. Moreover, the old method of securing money at home had crossed the 
tipping point. As a method of securing loans and service, the builders of the empire, 
Gustavus Adolphus, Queen Christina, and Karl X Gustav, had alienated large amounts of 
crown land, trading long-term revenues for needed short-term benefits. While this trade 
certainly was vital in building the empire, it was not sustainable over the long term. By 
the time of Karl XI’s regency, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the crown 






 The war had been a valuable wakeup call to Karl XI, and he was determined to 
correct the flaws of the Swedish system and provide for his successors a stable and 
sustainable system to defend the empire.  
Karl XI’s personality was in many ways well suited to confront this task. 
Personally he was introverted and lacked charisma, yet his sense of duty and justice 
inspired the legend of him as “old grey cloak,” a mysterious rider who would 
unexpectedly arrive to protect the weak and dispense impartial justice in their defense. He 
had a deep personal piety and saw himself as responsible before God for the welfare of 
his people and of Sweden. While uneducated compared to other monarchs of his day and 
rather unimaginative, he was hard working and had a mind for sober practical decision-
making. He knew his goals and systematically and pragmatically accomplished them, not 
through innovation but by harnessing old ideas and traditions as the building blocks of a 
functional, reliable, solution.  
The task confronting anyone attempting to rectify these deficiencies was 
significant even when just accounting for the strain of the war on state finance, much less 
any systemic issues. The crown’s debt as a result of the Scanian War was overwhelming. 
The government had pledged every conceivable income as collateral, and various 
ministers and the treasurer had personally taken out loans to keep the state afloat. Karl XI 
set out to change this perilous state of affairs. At the 1680 meeting of the Riksdag, he 
presented four questions that all hit at the same point, how was the government going to 
                                                             
3. In 1600, the land in Sweden was roughly divided into thirds between freeholding peasants, the 
crown, and the nobility. Before 1680, the nobility had increased their share to two-thirds of the land, with 
most of this being in the hands of the upper nobility. After the reduktion, it had returned to a roughly equal 
division between the crown, the nobility, and the peasants. A. F. Upton, “The Swedish Nobility, 1600-
1772,” in The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, vol. 2, Northern, Central 
and Eastern Europe, ed. H. H. Scott, 2nd ed. (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 14; Göran Rystad, 




get the resources it needed to assure the security of the kingdom. These four questions 
were open-ended queries to the four estates of the Riksdag asking them how to solve the 
big issues confronting the government. It was in this initial lack of concrete solutions that 
Karl XI was able to push through his agenda.
4
 All the estates fundamentally agreed on the 
necessity of solving the problems presented by the king, but how was a different 
question. What came out of the tumult of debate was a proposal for a full reduktion, the 
return of all the land given out by Karl XI’s predecessors to the nobility.
5
 While the three 
commoner estates of the Riksdag rallied around this proposal, the king’s agents divided 
the nobility. They suggested that the poorer nobility, the vast majority in terms of 
numbers, could keep their land. Karl XI had adeptly divided the nobility against each 
other, and in the end, they were only able to grumble as a partial reduktion passed in the 
Riksdag. 
For all the power the nobility had accumulated during the regency, their internal 
division had been growing. The lesser nobility rallied behind the king as they saw the 
growing power and wealth the aristocracy had been amassing while payments of their 
salaries as civil servants were irregular and unreliable.
6
 The whole of the nobility, 
including the aristocracy, had become a service class, professional military officers and 
bureaucrats in service of the Swedish state. The nobility had internalized the ethos of 
                                                             
4. The Riksdag in the early modern period had four estates, the nobility, the clergy, the towns, and 
the peasantry. Each estate held a single vote, though in practice decisions were made by a consensus of the 
estates. 
 
5. The reduktion concept was not unique to Sweden. Poland-Lithuania in the sixteenth century had 
attempted a similar reform, see Antoni Ma̧czak, “Exectio Bonorum and Reduktion: Two Essays in 
Solutions of the Domain-State Dilemma,” in The Swedish Riksdag in an International Perspective: Report 
from the Stockholm Symposium, April 25-27, 1988, ed. Nils Stjernquist (Stockholm: Riksbankens 
Jubileumfond, 1989), 96-111. 
 
6. Göran Rystad, “The King, the Nobility, and the Growth of Bureaucracy,” in Comité français 





state service and, fundamentally, they accepted that the king was merely asserting his 
rights to the fullest within the constitutional traditions of Sweden.
7
  
This particular seizure of power was quite different in scale from past 
consolidations of power by Swedish monarchs, and the manner in which Karl XI 
accomplished this was of a different nature as well. Where Gustav Vasa wielded great 
power with his oratory skill, Karl XI was a quiet introvert. Where Gustavus Adolphus 
collaborated with the nobility, Karl XI manipulated them. At the 1680 Riksdag Karl XI 
secured not only the reduktion, but transformed the Riksråd, into the “king’s council,” the 
kungliga råd, turning a stronghold of the nobility’s power in the kingdom’s governance 
into an entity extant only for his service. It was a coup against noble power, the first step 
in establishing an absolutist monarchy in Sweden. This coup continued at the 1682 
Riksdag where Karl XI used an array of tools to manipulate the whole assembly into 
supporting his plans. In the end, the nobility accepted the expropriation of any land ever 
donated to them by the crown. All they could do was beg for leniency. This reform, along 
with a strict restructuring of the government, and a tight budget, made the empire 
sustainable. For the first time the foreign domains of Sweden were able to support 
themselves financially. Over the next decade Karl XI continued this process, eventually 
accumulating to himself total power of taxation and lawmaking. He completely subverted 
the traditional prerogatives of the Riksdag, effectively, if not explicitly, with its consent.
8
 
                                                             
7. Paul Douglas Lockhart, Sweden in the Seventeenth Century (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), 125. Göran Rystad argues that even before the Riksdag of 1680 deference to royal power had a hold 
even in the Council. Rystad, Karl XI, 148. 
 
8. The establishment of Swedish absolutism shares strong parallels with the creation of the Danish 
absolutist monarchy in 1660 by Frederick III. In both cases absolutism came after military defeats, the 
Scanian War for Sweden and the “Karl Gustav Wars” for Denmark. Similarly, the commoner estates and 
the lesser nobility turning against the aristocracy were vital for the monarchy to be able to impose 




This went so far that, during the 1689 meeting of the Riksdag, the estates bowed to the 
king’s demands to have the minutes of the Riksdag during the regency altered to remove 
any language questioning the king’s rights and powers.
9
 
Whatever the faults of the previous system that Karl XI’s predecessors had 
created, they were all seeking a solution to the same problem, the relative poverty of the 
kingdom of Sweden. From the time of Gustav Vasa onwards, the monarchs of Sweden 
were in a constant struggle to find enough resources to protect their kingdom. Though the 
south of the country contained decent farmland, considering its northerly latitudes, the 
majority of the land in the country was uncultivatable, heavily forested, and barely 
inhabited. The only commercial and population center of note compared to the continent 
was Stockholm, and even that paled in comparison to major cites on the continent. The 
population of Sweden was around 1.25 million in 1620 and by the late seventeenth 
century 1.7-1.8 million, ten percent of the population of contemporary France, with the 
population of the whole empire being around 2.7-2.8 million.
10
 The constant strain of war 
took a tremendous toll on the population, between the years 1617-1721. One of every 
three Swedish men died in military service, mostly of disease, exposure, or injuries in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
substantial. The Danish aristocracy between 1647 and 1660 had almost complete control of central 
authority. Unlike Sweden where absolutism had roots in constitutional tradition, Frederick III’s victory also 
set in place a new political and constitutional order. The elective monarchy in Denmark was abolished, the 
administrative system had a thorough reorganization, and Frederick III instituted a new written constitution, 
the Lex regia. For an English language summary of the birth of Danish absolutism, its significance and 
longevity, see Paul Douglas Lockhart, Denmark, 1513-1660: The Rise and Decline of a Renaissance 
Monarchy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
9. One group of these excised passages were those that implied “the king’s right and power to 
make and interpret laws is strictly limited.” Acts presented by the King’s Council, March 14, 1689, in 
Sweden as a Great Power 1611-1697: Government, Society, Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Roberts (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1968), 86. 
 
10. Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden 






 Notwithstanding its poverty, Sweden did have some natural advantages in the 
form of massive deposits of iron and copper, as well as timber, tar, and charcoal. This 
would eventually enable Sweden to be one of the few states in Europe fully self-sufficient 
in cannon production. For a short time in the sixteenth century, Sweden was the only 
significant source of copper for Europe outside of Japan. Not until its success in the 
Thirty Years’ War was Sweden able to become something other than a poverty-stricken, 
cultural backwater. With the conquests of Karl X Gustav, who took from Denmark the 
breadbasket provinces of Skåne, Blekinge, and Halland, Sweden was a far cry from the 
impoverished kingdom of just half a century before. Still, it was not by any means a 
wealthy state when compared to other European great powers, like France. 
Just as the constant of poverty left an indelible mark on the Swedish state, the 
influence of the ancient tradition of building consensus and seeking unanimity in 
decision-making had a deep effect on political decision-making. From the days of the 
Vikings, communities, nobility, and kings met to discuss and solve important issues in a 
thing, or an assembly. The Swedish Riksdag was distinctive in the early modern period in 
that it gave the peasants and merchants a significant voice and equal voting power to the 
traditionally powerful classes in Europe, the nobility and clergy. Interaction between 
king, Riksdag, local leaders, village parsons, and traditional community assemblies 
                                                             
11. Lars Ericson, “Från offensiv till defensive. Mannskapsförsörjningen i den svenska armén och 
flottan under 1600-talet,” in Kriger og konger: Et streiftog i Nordens militærhistorie fra Syvårskrigen til 
den Skånske krig 1560-1680, ed. Treje H. Holm and Knut Arstad (Oslo: Forsvarsmuseet, 1997), 35. From 
1620-1719, Sweden lost half a million men to war, Lindegren estimates thirty percent of all adult Swedish 
and Finnish men. Jan Lindegren, “Men, Money, and Means,” in War and Competition between States, ed. 




remained a strong part of the decision-making process in Sweden, even after Karl XI 
forced the nobility to submit to his will.
12
 
The building of consensus itself was not unusual in early modern Europe. In fact, 
it was an important part of the political process in even an “absolutist” state.
13
 Sweden, 
and Scandinavia more generally, was not special in this regard. What was different was 
the ability of local communities to steer their own affairs and bargain with the crown, 
their ability to have a significant impact on regulations overall as well as their local 
implementation. Even into the seventeenth century, a peasant could request a personal 
audience with the king to air his grievances. Dialog stemming from the government’s 
side was active as well. Representatives of the central government, often local nobility 
who understood the situation of their area, would meet with their communities at the 
local assembly, the stämma, and engage in a discourse to gauge the needs, desires, and 
                                                             
12. For more on the influence of this tradition of consensus building, specifically in the case of the 
structure and power of these interactive institutions, see Mats Hallenberg, “For the Wealth of the Realm: 
The Transformation of the Public Sphere in Swedish Politics, c. 1434-1650,” Scandinavian Journal of 
History 37, no. 5 (2012): 557-77. For the medieval period, see Mia Korpiola, “‘Not without the Consent 
and Goodwill of the Common People’: The Community as a Legal Authority in Medieval Sweden,” The 
Journal of Legal History 35, no. 2 (2014): 95-119; Herman Schück, Rikets råd och män: Herredag och råd 
i Sverige 1280-1480 (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 2005). For the 
early history of the Riksdag, see Herman Schück, “Sweden’s Early Parliamentary Institutions from the 
Thirteenth to the Early Seventeenth Century,” in The Riksdag: A History of the Swedish Parliament, ed. 
Michael F. Metcalf (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988). For international comparisons of these 
institutions and traditions, see Nils Stjernquist, ed., The Swedish Riksdag in an International Perspective: 
Report from the Stockholm Symposium, April 25-27, 1988 (Stockholm: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, 1989); 
Peter Blickle, ed., Resistance, Representation, and Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 
13. Patrick K. O’Brien claims that co-option is now considered as important as coercion in 
sustaining Europe’s ancien regimes. That nominally absolute monarchs were in constant conflict and 
negotiation with powerful elite groups over local power. Patrick K. O’Brien, foreword to Mobilizing 
Resources for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early Modern Period, ed. H. V. Bowen and A. 
González Enciso (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2006), 10. James B. Collins, in the case of France, argued that 
despite notable centralization, the French financial administration from 1360 to 1660 never became a 
willing or able tool of the absolutist monarch: the state lacked the ability to enforce its decisions. What in 
modern terms would be inefficient, Collins argues, were precisely those elements that allowed the system 
to work at all, localism, high costs of collection, and privileges. James B. Collins, Fiscal Limits of 
Absolutism: Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Century France (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), 2. See, also Nicholas Henshall, The Myth of Absolutism: Change & Continuity in Early 




limits of the area. In Sweden, this ability for a locality to negotiate with the king created a 
unique manner of building consensus. For the Swedish monarchy to achieve its goals it 
had to deal directly with the ancient traditions that reinforced the role of communities in 
the local decision making process.
14
 
While negotiation and consensus building took place on a local level in Sweden, it 
was a fundamental part of the governance of the kingdom. Negotiation between crown 
and subjects on the nature, form, and amount of both taxation and conscription was a core 
part of the proceedings of the Riksdag throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
As codified in Magnus Eriksson’s Land Law of 1350, the basis of the constitution and 
law of Sweden until the early eighteenth century, the king would not seek additional 
revenue without negotiation and consent, from his subjects first.
15
 Although Karl XI’s 
absolutist policies would remove this power from the Riksdag, the building of consensus 
remained a core part of decision-making and policy implementation in the kingdom.
16
 
In the wake of the Scanian War Karl XI faced the weaknesses of the Swedish 
system. Although the most direct problems he faced stemmed from the mismanagement 
                                                             
14. The literature on consensus and cooperation between the state and the peasantry in Swedish 
society in the early modern period is quite extensive, particularly in relation to the negotiations between the 
two, see for example Peter Aronsson, Bönder gör politik: Det lokala självstyret som social arena i tre 
smålandssocknar, 1680-1850 (Lund: Lund University Press, 1992); Eva Österberg, Mentalities and Other 
Realities: Essays in Medieval and Early Modern Scandinavian History (Lund: Lund University Press, 
1991); Lars-Olof Larsson, Bönder och gårdar i stormaktspolitikens skugga: Studier kring 
hemmansklyvning, godsbildning och mantalssättning i Sverige 1625-1750 (Växjö: Högskolan i Växjö, 
1983); Peter Bickle, Steven Ellis, and Eva Österberg, “The Commons and the State: Representation, 
Influence, and the Legislative Process,” in Resistance, Representation, and Community, ed. Peter Bickle 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 115-54. 
 
15. Ruth Donner, ed., King Magnus Eriksson’s Law of the Realm: A Medieval Swedish Code, 
trans. Ruth Donner (Helsinki: Ius Gentium Association, 2000), 3. 
 
16. To quote Dag Retsö, “Neither feudalism nor absolutism was strong enough in Sweden to 
produce any substantial alteration of the system.” Dag Retsö, “No Taxation without Negotiation: War 
Economy, Taxes, and the Peasantry in Sweden in the Early 16th Century,” Scandinavian Journal of 




of the regency, they were only failing to perpetuate a system that was already unstable. 
Sweden, whatever the wealth it had gained over the last half century, was not wealthy 
enough for the obligations that it had accrued. Karl XI sought a solution for these 
problems and at the same time secured for himself absolutist power. After the 1680 
Riksdag the king had started Sweden down the road to financial stability, the next 
problem to address was how to make Sweden’s defense sustainable. Here Karl XI, just as 
Gustavus Adolphus and so many other Swedish monarchs before him, would use 





Arguments and Scope: Overcoming Poverty with Consensus 
 
Fixing the financial state of Sweden was only the first step in a broader plan to 
rebuild and reorganize the kingdom’s military defenses. It was at the next Riksdag, the 
Riksdag of 1682, that Karl XI moved to solve the problem of finding the manpower 
Sweden needed for its defense. At this meeting of the Riksdag, the king would start a 
long process that would harness Sweden’s history of consensus building and fostering 
public-private cooperation as an instrument of solving the problems he encountered in the 
Scanian War. By negotiating with the peasantry to achieve his goals, Karl XI would do 
more than legitimize his solution. He would use the dialog to gain information from the 
peasantry and with that information craft a new system for acquiring manpower that was 
stable and reliable, efficient over the long term. 
The Riksdag of 1682 further consolidated Karl XI’s power, but where the 
previous meeting of the Riksdag had sought a solution for the fiscal issues of Sweden, the 
Riksdag of 1682 added a more specific push to deal with the manpower problems 
revealed in the Scanian War. Where the last meeting of the Riksdag demolished the 
power of the Riksråd, this one contained an attack on one of the greatest powers of the 




employed the strategy of asking for a solution, rather than proposing a concrete plan. 
Then, as before, with the support of the commoner estates first, the Riksdag adopted the 
king’s desired option. This option, the indelningsverk, or more specifically its sub-
component the knekthåll, would have the peasantry in each landskap (province) negotiate 
a contract with the king to maintain permanently a full infantry regiment of 1,200 men in 
exchange for an exemption from the old and unpopular conscription system, the 
utskrivning.
17
 Five of the provinces, Uppland, Södermanland, Västmanland, Närke and 
Östergötland, would come together, negotiate, and sign a contract at the Riksdag of 1682. 
The other provinces would enter into individual negotiations over the coming years.
18
 
After the 1682 Riksdag, all the contract negotiations during the reign of Karl XI 
happened during the period from 1682 to 1697.
19
 The areas that entered into negotiations 
were not per se provinces or other, smaller, administrative divisions, but the areas that 
had a specific regiment attached to them.
20
 These were mostly individual provinces, but 
in some cases, a single län (county) would have its own regiment or multiple provinces 
supported a single regiment. Älvsborg län for example supported two regiments, one by 
itself and the other with the province of Dalsland, which was fully contained in the 
                                                             
17. Indelningsverk refers to both the knekthåll system for maintaining infantry and the rusthåll 
system for recruiting cavalry. However, it is not uncommon in the literature for the term indelningsverk just 
to refer to the infantry component. In general, the system set up before Karl XI is referred to as the elder 
indelningsverk and the system he set up as the younger indelningsverk, or more commonly, just the 
indelningsverk. 
 
18. While this contract would remain the foundation of the knekthåll, during the reign of Karl XI 
new sections would be added and old ones modified as new issues and ideas from the other negotiations 
arose. The province Närke, would entirely remove itself from the 1682 Riksdag contract, and instead 
negotiate another contract that took Värmland into account, as traditionally they both shared the obligation 
to support a single regiment. 
 
19. Ostrobothnia was the only area that did not complete its contract during the reign of Karl XI, 
taking until 1733 to conclude. 
 





northern half of Älvsborg län.
21
 County and province borders were not contiguous, and 
some counties borders could cross into several provinces, though some counties were 
entirely inside a single province. After Gustavus Adolphus’ reforms in 1634, the county 
was the primary administrative unit of local government directly below the king. A 
county contained multiple härad (districts), each made up of a number of socknar 
(parishes). The landshövdingar (governors) of the counties were the king’s primary 
representatives in the knekthåll negotiations, with lower levels of government not being 
formally involved. The knekthåll was not set up in any of the imperial territories such as 
those in Germany or Livonia, only in the kingdom of Sweden, modern day Sweden and 
Finland.
22
 Sweden and Finland were politically one entity up until the Finnish War 
(1807-1809), with the distinction between the two purely being a geographical reference. 
Despite Swedes and Finns being linguistically and culturally separate groups, the 
negotiations proceeded similarly as they were historically and constitutionally part of the 
same single political entity.
23
 
These negotiations, done in constant dialog between the king, his agents, and the 
peasantry, contain a direct look into the goals, methods, and priorities of the king in 
constructing the knekthåll system. This dialog elucidates the vital role of consensus 
                                                             
21. Of the areas that did not sign the Riksdag contract, and would negotiate their contracts with 
Karl XI later: Småland, consisting of Jönköping och Kronoberg län and Kalmar län, together raised three 
regiments; Finland, containing Viborg och Nyslott län, Åbo och Björneborg län, and Nyland och 
Tavastehus län, together raised six regiments; Värmland and Närke, two provinces that together raised one 
regiment; Västerbotten, which raised one regiment; and Västergötland consisting of Skaraborg län and 
Älvsborg län which, together with the province of Dalsland raised three regiments.  
 
22. According to Ågren, the Riksdag of 1682 did not consider the introduction of the knekthåll in 
the former Danish provinces of Skåne, Blekinge, and Halland. Sven Ågren, Karl XI:s indelningsverk för 
armén: Bidrag till dess historia åren 1679-1697 (Uppsala: Wretmans Boktryckeri, 1922), 169. 
 
23. Øystein Rian, “Introduction: Government and Society in Early Modern Scandinavia 1560-
1721,” in A Revolution from Above?: The Power State of 16th and 17th Century Scandinavia, ed. Leon 




building and achieving cooperation, not just as a function of legitimization, but also as a 
method, a tool, for Karl XI to align the knekthåll system with the “real resources” of a 
locality. By adapting his resource acquisition system to the reality of the peasant’s 
conditions and their perceptions of acceptable resource withdrawals by the state, the “real 
resources” of a locality, the king was able to create a more efficient and smooth 
functioning system over the long-term. The course of these negotiations with the 
individual provinces show Karl XI actively negotiating and that he personally sought, 
aligned, and modified his goals to seek cooperative solutions over coercive ones. His 
intention was not to create a top down, strictly applied system, but one that was 
deliberately flexible to local conditions to foster broader goals of efficiency and 
effectiveness in its function. Through negotiation and establishing consensus, Karl XI 
intended to build a results-oriented system rather than one that conformed strictly to a 
single rigidly applied vision. Negotiation thus became a tool, a method of gathering 
information to allow the adaptation of the resource gathering apparatus of the state, the 
knekthåll system, to the real resources of the locality. Consensus becoming a solution to 
the kingdom’s desperate need to maximize its limited resources. 
The building of a stable manpower acquisition system was an essential priority for 
Karl XI. The experience of the Scanian War demonstrated, brutally, that the utskrivning 
would not suffice in times of great stress to protect the kingdom. Hence, Sweden needed 
to develop a system with strong foundations that would reliably and consistently provide 
the necessary manpower for the military. Dependable and consistent resource extraction 
would greatly enhance the efficiency so needed to maximize Sweden’s limited resource 




all times a known value of resources. A long-term steady stream of resources, established 
into the future, was more efficient than the potentially arduous, unpopular, and 
inconsistent, in quantity and quality, extractions of the utskrivning system. An efficient 
system for Karl XI was a stable system. 
Stability in resource extraction, particularly a stability that maximizes resource 
withdrawals over the long term, necessitates an alignment with the real resources of an 
area. In the long term over extraction is harmful and counterproductive, while under 
extraction leaves potentially available resources on the table. Adaptation to the local 
environment tunes the system to the real resources of the locality. Negotiation, dialog 
aimed at achieving consensus on the specifics of the resource extraction, is one tool for 
local adaptation, one that has numerous added benefits. The utilization of dialog serves as 
a method to find the balance point where the extraction of resources reaches a point 
where it becomes detrimental to future extraction. It pits both sides of the negotiation, 
with their own intimate knowledge of their resources, needs, and situations, against each 
other in a bargaining process to work out what both can sustain and maximize. Through 
the consensus building of dialog, negotiation achieves local adaptation by finding the 
acceptable, or rather the legitimized, amount of extractable resources.
24
 Efficiency 
originates from the stability of knowledge of real resources, with negotiation as a tool 
that processes and obtains this knowledge and legitimizes future extraction.
25
 
                                                             
24. As Nils Erik Villstrand points out, “because of dialogue the extraction of resources could be 
adapted to a diversified local reality and thus became more tolerable.” Nils Erik Villstrand, “Adaptation or 
Protestation: Local Community Facing Conscription of Infantry for the Swedish Armed Forces, 1620-
1679,” in A Revolution from Above?: The Power State of 16th and 17th Century Scandinavian, ed. Leon 
Jespersen (Odense: Odense University Press, 2000), 255. 
 
25. Jan Lindegren makes a similar point, arguing that legitimization, participation, and 
communication allowed for greater resource withdrawals from the peasantry. Jan Lindegren, “Ökade 




Although negotiation can bring about stability via discovering and adapting to the 
real resource of the area, it has a dual function where the goal of stability is concerned. 
The building of consensus and achieving legitimacy brought about by genuine and active 
negotiation can also help to secure the stability of the system. Legitimacy fosters 
cooperation, and from voluntary consent the resource extraction of the system becomes 
acceptable and even understood as a benefit to the peasantry, or at least a needed sacrifice 
for a mutually agreed upon goal. The building of consensus also mitigates, if not stops, 
the inefficiencies and destruction of civil unrest and protestation that over-extraction of 
resources can bring. The pressures of utskrivning caused numerous acts of protest and 
passive resistance, from peasants picking up and moving to exempt areas or even 
crossing the border to Russia, to new recruits deserting, to other subtler acts that could 
hinder the smooth functioning of the system.
26
 The building of consensus, and the 
seeking of approval and legitimization, had deep roots in Swedish society. Utilizing these 
did not just bring benefits, but prevented unnecessary friction.  
Standing seemingly in contrast to this tradition of consensus building was the 
absolutism of Karl XI, an absolutism where there was a broad acceptance across the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
og øvrighet i Norden ca. 1550-1750, ed. Harald Winge (Oslo: Norsk lokalhistorisk institutt, 1992), 202. See 
also Sven A. Nilsson, De stora krigens tid: Om Sverige som militärstat och bondesamhälle (Stockholm: 
Almqvist och Wiksell International, 1990). 
 
26. Violent acts of protestation, rebellion, civil unrest, or tax riots, were rare in Sweden in this 
period. There were no peasant revolts in Sweden after 1597. Glete, War and the State in Early Modern 
Europe, 194. For more on the impact and influence of this protestation, see Villstrand, “Adaptation or 
Protestation,” 304, 308; Eva Österberg, “Alternative Protests among Ordinary People in Early Modern 
Sweden,” in Mentalities and Other Realities: Essays in Medieval and Early Modern, ed. Eva Österberg 






society that there could not be any legal restraints on the king’s God given powers.
27
 By 
1682, the king had yet to achieve total legislative control over of the country, but was 
well on his way. At the Riksdag of 1682, a member of the noble estate questioned the 
king’s overstep into the traditional prerogatives of the Riksdag. This so-called “Anders 
Lilliehöök affair” led the nobility to distance themselves from that member’s statements 
and in doing so entrenched the legitimacy of the king’s actions. The nobles in the Riksdag 
clarified that, “should Y.M. [Your Majesty] find anything in that law which it may be 
necessary to alter, or clarify, or improve … then it is accepted that the king has the right 
and the power to do it.”
28
 Certainly, by the Riksdag of 1693, while the negotiations in 
Finland were still ongoing, the king had achieved unquestioned authority over the 
kingdom.
29
 That Karl XI had the power was unquestioned, yet absolutist monarchs in 
Sweden and on the continent still sought, and were even dependent on, cooperation and 
agreement from the estates of their realms. Karl XI chose to negotiate not just the 
contracts for the knekthåll, but many other issues where ostensibly he could have decided 
on the course of action based solely on his discretion.
30
 The literature on the negotiations 
                                                             
27. A. F. Upton, “Absolutism and the Rule of the Law: The Case of Karl XI,” Parliaments, 
Estates and Representation 8, no. 1 (1988): 46; Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1967), 246. 
 
28. Minutes of the Estates of the Nobility, November 4, 1682, in Sweden as a Great Power 1611-
1697: Government, Society, Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Roberts (London: Edward Arnold, 1968), 84. 
 
29. As stated in the resolution of the Riksdag of 1693, “he [Karl XI] and all his heirs ... have been 
set to rule over us as absolute sovereign kings, whose will is binding upon us all, and who are responsible 
for their actions to no man on earth, but have power and authority to govern and rule their realm, as 
Christian Kings, at their own pleasure” Resolution of the Diet, November 20, 1693, in Sweden as a Great 
Power 1611-1697: Government, Society, Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Roberts (London: Edward Arnold, 
1968), 89. Concerning the absolutism of Karl XI, Upton argues that there was nothing in Swedish legal 
tradition that ultimately bound the ruler’s powers. Upton, “Absolutism and the Rule of the Law,” 46. 
 
30. In reference to one particular case during the negotiations around the contracts for the 
knekthåll, Upton notes that it shows an, “interesting glimpse of a king who was theoretically absolute 
entering into genuine negotiation with his subjects and making real concessions to get agreement” Upton, 




of the knekthåll contracts is for the most part silent on this point: why did a monarch, who 
had broad acceptance of his absolute power by society, seem so willing to negotiate on 
even minute issues of critical areas like national defense?
31
     
Despite the fact that Karl XI did not abrogate the negotiations in their entirety, 
perhaps his absolute power was acting as a subtle force of coercion in the negotiations. 
When entering the knekthåll contract negotiations Karl XI stood at a certain advantage in 
that he was defining the terms, not all possible options for filling the 1,200 man 
regiments were open. The basis of the negotiations started at a pre-accepted framework, 
the basic concepts of the knekthåll system as set out in the Riksdag contract. The king 
entered into the negotiations on the high ground even before factoring in his absolute 
authority. 
The course of the negotiations over the knekthåll tells a different story. The 
consistent nature of Karl XI conceding and modifying his bargaining positions would 
seem to play against the notion that negotiations were a cover for coercion. Although the 
simple nature of power dynamics in these situations would point at a minimum to the 
peasantry regulating themselves in deference to an acknowledged authority, the dialog in 
these negotiations on both ends was a sincere attempt at bargaining and compromise. The 
hard stances taken by the king and his agents in these negotiations were a natural part of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the case of a request from the city of Örebro. As Dag Lindström explains, in the king’s response he avoided 
applying his absolutist power to reject their request. Rather than a direct denial, the response contained a 
legal argument against their request and a referral to the Swedish bureaucracy to resolve the matter. Dag 
Lindström, “Om konsten att inte säga nej. Kungliga resolutioner på städers besvär under 1680-talet,” in Allt 
på ett bräde: Stat, ekonomi och bondeoffer: En vänbok till Jan Lindegren, ed. Peter Ericsson, Fredrik 
Thisner, Patrik Winton, and Andreas Åkerlund (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2013), 235. 
 
31. Kamppinen observes that the literature on this subject has hardly examined why a monarch 
with absolute power like Karl XI would favor negotiation, especially considering these negotiations dealt 
with such a sensitive subject as national security. Even Ågren’s Karl XI:s indelningsverk för armén, does 
not deal with this question, but takes negotiation as a given. Toni Kamppinen, “Ömsesidiga förhandlingar 
eller överhetens tvång? En interaktionsstudie utgående från avtalen om ständigt knekthåll i den karolinska 




the negotiating process, not per se a subtle cloak to manipulate a desire for deference. 
Negotiation is a process that involves hard stances, fighting for and defending a 
bargaining line, unless its compromise achieves the higher purpose of the negotiation 
itself. Even before the discussions with the peasantry began, the king communicated with 
his negotiators to establish their objectives in the negotiations, or what was even 
reasonable to expect from a locality. This was not stepping over direct negotiation of the 
issues. Rather the discourse between the king and his negotiators was, to some degree or 
another, pre-emptive modification for acceptance and ensuring goals aligned with the real 
resources. Aspects of any negotiation process are constantly open to coercive actions by 
one side or the other, but it is critical not to mistake core elements of the process itself for 
the application of absolutist power. This power may be an ever-looming influence, but 
measurement of it across the course of negotiations must be appropriate. 
Certain hard bargaining positions, or rather overall goals and the initial 
framework of the knekthåll system itself, provide a basis for an analysis of the 
negotiations. This framework, the basic principles of the knekthåll system as laid down in 
the Riksdag contract, established certain norms from which future negotiations would 
proceed. The modification of future contracts would stem from this baseline, the 
framework outlined in the Riksdag contract serving as the basis of the king’s future 
negotiating positions.   
The number of soldiers in a regiment, 1,200 men per regiment in Sweden and 
1,000 per regiment in Finland, was one of these hard negotiating positions taken by the 






 For Karl XI this was a core goal of the system, a set number of men, 1,200 
or 1,000, permanently and unfailingly sustained. It was an indispensable number for the 
king, if not non-negotiable, than at the very least his foremost negotiating position and 
goal in the negotiations. Sven Ågren argues that the number of soldiers in the regiments, 
either 1,200 or 1,000 respectively, was an inviolable standard from which the 
negotiations would otherwise progress.
33
  
Starting with these known qualities, the framework of the knekthåll system as 
outlined in the Riksdag contract and the core goal of attaining a certain number of 
soldiers, allows for the measurement of the degree of change across the process of 
negotiation. The more subtle goals for the knekthåll system developing out of the reasons 
and the results of the king’s flexibility, if there were any. His balancing of different goals, 
methods, and priorities in this process of concession and modification of negotiating 
positions can clarify his underlying intentions. These chains of negotiation, the step-by-
step process of concession and modification by Karl XI in the negotiation dialog, acted as 
a method to demonstrate his “revealed preferences.”
34
 Beyond just the process of change 
                                                             
32. The reason for the Riksdag contract only including the 1,200 number was that none of the 
Finnish provinces signed it. The king established the 1,000 number for Finland at the Riksdag of 1682, 
though without Finland joining the negotiations the point was moot.  
 
33. Ågren, Karl XI:s indelningsverk för armén, 137, 168. 
 
34. This concept of analyzing actions and choices to reveal the preferences of individuals stems 
from Paul. A. Samuelson’s A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour. This theory offered an 
empirical solution to attempts to measure consumer preferences and relative or marginal utility. It proposed 
using observed consumer actions, rather than stated preferences, to determine their true preferences. Put 
simply, actions speak louder than words. Paul A. Samuelson, “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s 
Behaviour,” Economica 5, no. 17 (February 1938): 61-71. Samuelson further refines his theory in Paul A. 
Samuelson, “Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference,” Economica 15, no. 60 (November 
1948): 243-53. An example of the practical application of the concepts of this theory by a historian, albeit 
unintentionally, is Stellan Dahlgren’s Karl XI:s envälde – Kameralistisk absolutism?. In this essay, 
Dahlgren argues that Karl XI’s fiscal policy aligned with the tenants of cameralism. Although there is no 
proof Karl XI had any knowledge of the theory, Dahlgren demonstrated that the king’s actions aligned with 




and the final results, the explicit and implicit statements of the king can act to reveal the 
king’s intentions in the nuances of the system’s implementation. Moreover, the king’s 
intentions can answer if these negotiations were due to need or desire and if he was using 
the negotiations to accomplish a higher purpose.
35
 
The negotiations around certain specific elements of the Riksdag contract 
framework show the detail and nuances of the king modifying this initial framework. Of 
the areas covered in these contracts the negotiation chains for the lega, a negotiable 
enlistment bonus offered to entice new recruits, and the soldier’s payment are two 
primary areas of importance when considering flexibility from the Riksdag contract. For 
instance, the Riksdag contract’s express prohibition of the lega, which unlike many other 
items in the contract had specific justifications listed for the decision. Similarly, the 
course of negotiations concerning the number of soldiers in Finland and Småland exhibit 
prominent examples of the king’s flexibility and aims in doing so. Considering the 
indispensable nature of attaining the goal of 1,200 or 1,000 men per regiment, flexibility 
from this rigid standard is vital for observing the structuring goals and priorities relative 
to one another in these negotiations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
kameralistisk absolutism?,” in Makt & vardag: Hur man styrde, levde och tänkte, under svensk 
stormaktstid, ed. Stellan Dahlgren, Anders Florén, and Åsa Karlsson (Stockholm: Atlantis, 1993), 115-33. 
 
35. The documents used to construct these negotiation chains come from Sigfrid L. Gahm 
Persson’s Landt-Milice Förordningar, an eighteenth-century collection of regulations, contracts, letters, 
and other documents relating to the Swedish military from 1680-1718. This collection contains a wealth of 
correspondence between administrators, the central government, and the crown, including many related to 
the indelningsverk. The collection does not contain a complete record of all the documents pertaining to the 
negotiations. Nonetheless, vol. 1, 1680-1685, and vol. 3, 1692-1694, contain an extensive number of 
documents regarding the negotiations so that it is possible to follow the overall chains of negotiation and 
discern the king’s actions and intentions. Sigfrid L. Gahm Persson, ed., Kongl. stadgar, förordningar, bref 
och resolutioner, angående Swea rikes landt-milice til häst och fot 1680–1718, vol. 1 and 3 (Stockholm, 
1762-1798). The selection of documents in these collections originated solely from the king, and Gahm 
Persson did not include documents that he was not positively certain were authentic. Kamppinen, 




With these contract negotiations, Karl XI was able to gain information on the real 
resources of an area while legitimizing the future extraction of said resources. With hard 
bargaining lines he could push the peasantry to get the most out of them, but ultimately 
he was flexible, taking into account the local situation and the opinions of the peasantry. 
He was seeking information on the real resources from those best acquainted with the 
reality of the situation in the area, both the theoretically available resources and those that 
the peasantry would be willing or able to produce for the king. Karl XI chose to negotiate 
and actively cooperated and conceded to achieve consensus. Over the course of 
negotiating the different aspects of these individual contracts Karl XI’s deeper intentions 
and goals for the system become clear. His aim was not for a set resolution to any of the 
individual details in the contracts. He was intentionally flexible to create a more stable 
system with less friction, less transaction costs, one legitimized and aligned with the real 
resources of each area. In doing so, Karl XI used consensus and public-private 






Historiography: Alternative Methods for Building a Strong State 
 
The knekthåll contract negotiations undertaken by Karl XI were all a part of his 
wider attempt to rebuild the military capabilities of the Swedish state. Like other early 
modern states, Sweden struggled to find effective ways to use its limited resources to 
meet the growing burdens of war. The development of states in relation to war, and how 
those states developed to procure the resources to fight them is the subject of a well-
developed and nuanced literature, from the concept of the military revolution to the 
fiscal-military state. Karl XI’s methods of consensus building and negotiation, working 
with and delegating to private interests, ties in with both the growing literature on 
military entrepreneurship and the long standing Swedish literature on  the role of 
consensus and dialog versus coercive state power in the Swedish system. These two 
fields of literature both deal with different methods by which the state obtained the 
resources it needed, and when considered together demonstrate the value of the tool of 
negotiation and delegation to the building of a strong central state.      
For Karl XI, the defense of his kingdom was a paramount goal, and he used 
negotiation as an instrument for achieving that objective. In these negotiations, the king 




to accomplish his main objectives, he was more than happy to leave certain minor details 
of the implementation of the knekthåll system for the peasantry to decide. Karl XI built a 
system that was decentralized, moving the burden of recruiting and compensating the 
soldiers to the local level, all the while setting the details of the system not with his power 
as the absolute monarch of Sweden, but via negotiation. 
A cursory survey of the literature on the early modern period, indeed any period 
of history, can provide a skewed perception of the relative importance of certain states 
and topics. The topics of interest to historians today do not always match their relative 
importance in the past. Sweden has often fallen into this gap between relative importance 
and quantity of related literature. The knekthåll, and the indelningsverk more broadly, has 
consequently ended up as a fringe of a fringe topic, rarely discussed and often in little 
detail in the English language literature. 
Building off earlier systems of conscription and other methods for the Swedish 
state to acquire the necessary resources for defense, the indelningsverk was an important 
tool in Sweden’s struggle to balance its resources with its perceived needs. The historian 
Otto Hintze, in particular, stressed the role of international relations as an important 
driver of state formation and development. Hintze argued that there was a strong tie 
between the constitution of a state’s political institutions and its military, and that the 
state’s place in the state system surrounding it was an influence on the development of 
both.
36
 Along this same line of thought is the work of Charles Tilly. For Tilly, war 
spurred the development of the state as external pressure forced states to build more and 
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better institutions of resource extraction. His pairing of state formation with the 
development of the state’s monopoly on violence, both internal and external, has helped 
to incorporate military history as a central component in the long debate on how states 
developed.
37
 From this origin, a broad literature has sprouted up exploring the connection 




The concept of a “military revolution” in early modern Europe builds off this 
idea. It argues that there was a close connection between the early modern state and the 
growing need of these states for the resources of war: that the dramatic changes in early 
modern militaries acted as a powerful impetus to state formation. The connection of the 
indelningsverk to the long-standing historiography of the military revolution stems from 
the theory’s originator himself, the late Michael Roberts. A historian of early modern 
Sweden, Roberts formulated his theory with Sweden as one of his primary examples.
39
 A 
central point of his argument is that there was a marked growth in army sizes across the 
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period, mirrored by a growth in state apparatuses to support these new larger and more 
expensive armies. Roberts may not have explicitly mentioned the indelningsverk, but it 
clearly fits as an instrument of the military revolution in Sweden.
40
  
To meet these spiraling costs of war, states had to develop institutions capable of 
insuring the resource needs of their militaries. Initially formulated in The Sinews of 
Power by John Brewer, the fiscal-military state concept ties together two important 
aspects of the early modern state, revenue collection and military expenditure.
41
 Brewer 
especially stressed the former, the development of state-directed revenue collection 
mechanisms. With an emphasis on the building of bureaucracy: Brewer details the 
growing costs of war for the British state in concert with the development of state to meet 
those needs. Later works in fiscal-military state literature would take this idea beyond its 
focus on acquisition of monetary resources and examine other resources, as well as 
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Jan Glete’s War and the State in Early Modern Europe builds upon Brewer’s 
argument, stressing fiscal-military states as complex organizations that brought together 
social, economic, and technical resources in a way that produced innovation and 
efficiency.
43
 Concentrating specifically on the state’s use of entrepreneurship and 
amalgamating disparate interests, Glete puts forward the process of bargaining over 
political and organizational innovations as a driver of the state’s development and the 
creation of greater efficiencies.
44
 His argument emphasizes how states used a double 
contractual relationship, one between rulers and society, and another between rulers and 
the armed forces. This aggregation of existing political interests in a society reduced 
transaction costs and increased cooperation, thus helping to create large and efficient 
organizations for war. Further, the “network of contracts” between state and local society 
could serve as both methods of control and dialogue.
45
 Glete argues that rather than 
cooperating under the arrangements of old systems, fiscal-military states innovated first 
then sought to align consensus.
46
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The concept of the fiscal-military state places a specific emphasis on the methods 
the state used to obtain resources. One of these methods, private military 
entrepreneurship, forms the basis of a small but growing literature.
47
 This scholarship 
pushes against older notions that predicate the growth of state power on centralization 
and associate any decentralization or delegation by the state, such as the use of private 
military entrepreneurs, with weakness of the state. A microcosm of this line of thought is 
Eli Heckscher’s contention that the indelningsverk was a step backwards in the 
development of the Swedish state, locking Sweden’s military in a “medieval” model and 
stepping back from Gustavus Adolphus’ advances in public finance.
48
 Michael Roberts 
summed up this line of thinking that the indelningsverk was decentralizing by pointing 
out that it was a reversion from a cash-based recruitment system to an in-kind system. It 
was at best a reversal, at worst a degeneration, arguably moving from the seventeenth 
century back to the sixteenth century in terms of military finance.
49
  
                                                             
47. This literature emanates from Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His 
Workforce: A Study in Economic and Social History (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964). For examples of the 
modern discussion on this topic, see also Rafael Torres Sánchez, Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish 
Contractor State; Jeff Fynn-Paul, ed., War, Entrepreneurs and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 
1300-1800 (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 
 
48. Eli F. Hecksher, An Economic History of Sweden, trans. Göran Ohlin (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1963), 124-25. E. Ladewig Petersen challenges Heckscher’s argument in regards to the 
indelningsverk, contending that “The crucial factor, plainly, is not the type of financial organisation  
(domain state or tax state) but the fact that the crown was able to make, and  to ensure compliance with, its 
demands for resources in whatever form best  suited current needs, whether this was taxes in cash or in 
kind, revenues from  crown lands, or labour services.” E. Ladewig Petersen, “From Domain State to Tax 
State: Synthesis and Interpretation,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 23, no. 2 (1975): 117. 
 
49. Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, 234. Alf Åberg also defends the indelningsverk system 
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Parrott contends with this view in The Business of War, challenging the traditional 
narrative of state growth as a continual process of centralization.
50
 Although his specific 
argument concerns the role of private military entrepreneurship, broadly, he suggests 
alternative modes of state formation. According to Parrott, states can utilize a range of 
different instruments of resource management and procurement, while not undermining 
the state’s overall centralization of authority and its acquisition of a monopoly on 
violence.
51
 He demonstrates that states do not have to follow a singular linear, 
centralizing, model of state formation in the development of their organs of resource 
management. On the contrary, he shows that delegation and decentralization, when done 
in the wider pursuit of the state’s goals, can actually contribute to state formation.
52
 
The military entrepreneurship literature acts to develop the full array of 
instruments that a state could bring to bear in expanding its power. A central theme in 
this literature is that delegation and decentralization could allow the state to access a 
wider array of resources than were otherwise available to it at that time. That states could 
harness private entrepreneurship as a tool for the state to achieve its goals and thus 
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increase its power. Military entrepreneurs were a diverse group, from mercenaries, to 
supply contractors, to financiers, to privateers. These private purveyors of violence acted 
according to their own interests, yet they provided the fiscal-military state with the 




Any examination of Karl XI’s intentions regarding the indelningsverk, or any 
government policy, must deal with the less than flattering modern interpretation of him. 
Alf Åberg challenges older views of Karl XI, namely that he was the sole guiding force 
of the transformation, an unshakable rock. Instead, Åberg presents the king as indecisive 
and easily influenced by his advisors.
54
 The king knew what goals he wanted to achieve, 
but he did not have a clear or unshakable perception of how to achieve his goals. Roberts’ 
refers to him as unimaginative, lacking in tactical and strategic thought. In a similar vein, 
Anthony Upton also sees Karl XI as lacking in inventiveness asserting that, “it is a fair 
assumption that Karl XI never had a novel or original thought in his life.”
55
 The most 
recent biography of Karl XI, Göran Rystad’s Karl XI: En biografi, challenges this view. 
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Rystad makes an argument against seeing Karl XI as intellectually ill equipped, 
formalistic, and pedantic, instead describing him as someone who usually most clearly 
grasped the essence of the matter and got straight to the point. Addressing Åberg’s 
argument that the king’s advisors easily swayed Karl XI to their own positions, Rystad 
counters by pointing out the king’s systematic reduction of the power invested in all of 
the various bureaucratic entities. Rystad argues that the king used his advisors because he 
wanted the best possible basis for making his decisions, and that he systematically 
utilized referral procedures to get views and advice from more than one direction.
56
 
The indelningsverk does not have an especially rich literature in English. Even 
though Sweden is not an unfamiliar topic in early modern military history, mentions of 
the indelningsverk by name are infrequent. Surveys of early modern military history often 
discuss Sweden’s notable ability to mobilize resources, particularly manpower, without 
mentioning the indelningsverk. The few exceptions to this are of variable quality, with 
some constructed as a patchwork of facts produced with a surface level of understanding 
of the system overall. There is only a narrow selection of works in English that provide a 
substantial, detailed, and accurate description of the system, but these works are 
individually limited. Most are overviews of the system and are of limited scope in terms 
of the period of time they cover. Broadly, they are descriptive and not argumentative. 
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The Swedish language literature is significantly larger and more diverse, 
particularly in having a greater number of long studies, but overall has some notable 
limitations. These flaws stem not from the amount of literature, but that very narrow 
studies of the indelningsverk make up the bulk of the literature, specifically ones within 
the fields of social and cultural history.
58
 Broader, comprehensive surveys that look at the 
full scope and effects, either social or military, are sparse.
59
 The period before the Great 
Northern War, when Karl XI was first setting up the indelningsverk, has not received as 
much attention as later periods, though it nevertheless contains some of the best studies 
on the indelningsverk overall.
60
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XI and Swedish Absolutism; Åberg, “The Swedish Army from Lützen to Narva,” 265-87; Robert I. Frost, 
The Northern Wars 1558-1721: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721 (Harlow: 
Longman, 2000); For the elder indelningsverk the single most comprehensive description in English is 
Villstrand, “Adaptation or Protestation.” In relation to the navy, Jan Glete, Swedish Naval Administration, 
1521-1721: Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities (Leiden: Brill, 2010). While shorter 
descriptions of the indelningsverk tend to be of variable quality, an excellent summary is Lockhart, Sweden 
in the Seventeenth Century. For a condensed description of the elder indelningsverk, see Richard Brzezinski 
and Richard Hook, The Army of Gustavus Adolphus: 1 Infantry (London: Osprey, 1991). 
 
58. For narrowly focused studies on specific aspects of the indelningsverk, see Janne Backlund, 
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A significant trend in Swedish language literature on the early modern Swedish 
state is the ongoing debate between the interaktionsperspektivet (interaction perspective) 
and maktstats teorin (power state theory). Interaction perspective looks at the relationship 
between central power and peasantry as a relationship based on discourse and reciprocity. 
Eva Österberg, the originator of this concept, argues that both central power and peasant 
society endeavored for consensus solutions. Österberg and Erling Sandmo contend that 
due to the conglomerate nature of the Scandinavian states they had to be “negotiating 
state[s]” to achieve legitimacy amongst their subjects.
61
 Conversely, advocates of the 
power state perspective see this relationship as fundamentally coercive and manipulative, 
any negotiations being ultimately a ruse with the end result being inevitably in the state’s 
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sydvästra Sverige under och efter nordiska sjuȧrskriget (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1971); Johan Holm, 
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 Peter Ericsson and Kamppinen both argue that these two perspectives, often 
posited as dichotomous, are not necessarily so.
63
 
Arguing for an interaction perspective, Nils Erik Villstrand’s Adaptation or 
Protestation is an analysis of peasant reactions to the imposition of coercive central 
authority, specifically conscription.
64
 Here he argues that the various forms of resistance 
to conscription forced interaction between local communities and the state. Consequently, 
resistance forced the state to modify its methods of resource extraction to accord more 
with the community, at least if the state wished for efficiency in achieving its aims. 
Villstrand’s essay draws attention to the interaction between state and localities, an 
interaction that compelled the state to recognize that it needed to adapt in order to 
manage resources efficiently. The state, to avoid resistance, sought at least some 
consensus or cooperation as a method of improving itself. A lack of knowledge forced 
the central government into “interactive intercourse.”
65
    
Taken collectively, these arguments from Glete, Parrott, and Villstrand intersect 
at the importance of consensus, cooperation, delegation, and decentralization as a means 
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Österberg, “Vardagens sträva samförstånd: Bondepolitik i den svenska modellen från vasatid till frihetstid,” 
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of expanding the early modern state’s military capabilities. They mutually expand the 
argument of the military entrepreneurship literature with their focus on interaction and 
delegation, public-private partnership, as methods for early modern states to become 
more efficient. Their arguments demonstrate that cooperative solutions are not per se 
evidence of a weak state, but rather alternative instruments of state formation and 
development. That cooperation and dialog acted as a mechanism for the fiscal-military 
state to provide the information necessary to optimize the state’s resource gathering 
apparatus to its fullest potential.
66
 
Karl XI, whatever his personal weaknesses, built a system utilizing this method of 
optimization. In the knekthåll contract negotiations, dialog was not the sign of a weak 
monarch, nor was the decentralization and delegation a sign of a weak state. Rather it was 
a tool for building a stronger state, a tool with its own characteristics that provided its 
own advantages. With negotiation, Karl XI was able to tap into local knowledge and 
incentive structures, while discourse and consensus building found the limits of 
extraction and legitimized them. Karl XI utilized experts on local information, be they his 
agents or the peasantry, so that he could have the best possible basis on which to set his 
negotiating positions and offer compromises so that he could satisfy his objectives. For 
Karl XI the tradition of building consensus became an instrument of building the state, 
just as other old Swedish ideas became the building blocks for the indelningsverk itself.
                                                             
66. Magnus Linnarsson’s Postgång på växlande villkor looks at the changing nature of the public-
private partnership in Sweden’s postal system during the seventeenth century. Specifically he analyzes why 
the Swedish state chose between public and private options, or degrees in between, as a method to achieve 
its different objectives across time. This study shows the role of transaction costs, be they economic or 
political, in the state’s choice for changing the organization of its postal system at different times. Magnus 
Linnarsson, Postgång på växlande villkor: Det svenska postväsendets organisation under stormaktstiden 





Background: The Roots and Organization of the Indelningsverk 
 
Over its history, Sweden, with its limited resources, had to develop a number of 
different systems to find the manpower it needed. Both component systems of the 
indelningsverk, the knekthåll and the rusthåll, had a long lineage in Swedish history. 
From these roots, Karl XI developed a broader system that systematically applied the 
elements of old ideas in a single comprehensive framework. To counter Sweden’s limited 
resources Karl XI, just as his forbears, turned to harnessing traditional arrangements in 
new and more effective ways.  
Sweden’s limited resources had a profound effect on its military development in 
terms of the composition of its army: in an age of mercenary soldiers, Sweden relied on 
conscription first. Mercenary troops and other sorts of private military contractors were a 
key part of armies across Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Sweden’s 
Scandinavian rival, Denmark, made extensive use of mercenary soldiers and had a long 
history of using them against Sweden.
67
 Conscription of native manpower, particularly 
the use of men raised via a militia system, was not specific to Sweden alone. It was the 
poorer and more rural states of Europe, such as Russia, Sweden, and Prussia, that had to
                                                             




rely on compulsorily service.
68
 In Sweden, Gustav Vasa transformed the medieval militia 
levee into a reliable conscription system, allowing a cash-strapped Sweden to defend 
itself without the large outlays a mercenary force would require.
69
 Sweden did of course 
raise mercenary armies when it could afford them, such as when they had occupied 
territories they could extort during the Thirty Years’ War, but even then conscription still 
had an important role.  
The system established by Gustav Vasa had deep roots in Swedish history. The 
old medieval rights of the sovereign to call upon the peasantry to defend the realm had 
lived on in the reigns of Gustav Vasa and Erik XIV, both of whom tried to utilize this 
militia system, the uppbåd, in the defense of the kingdom. Under this system every sixth 
man in the kingdom, aside from Småland where it was every fifth man, was under the 
obligation to turn out if the king summoned them. However, the uppbåd was essentially a 
defensive system, it came out of an obligation to defend, and the conscripts were 
reluctant to fight abroad. The system of utskrivning originated in the 1550s as a more 
robust system for conscription than the defense-oriented peasant militias formed by the 
uppbåd. The utskrivning system created by Gustav Vasa utilized local bailiffs and 
parsons to register the eligible men in a parish for more efficient conscription. The king 
would provide these conscripts with training, weapons, and payment for their service. 
With this new system there was now a separation that did not exist with the uppbåd. The 
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utskrivning detached the conscripts from the agricultural production cycle, they did not 
need to return home to maintain their farms as the old peasant militia often would. Erik 
XIV built a substantial permanent army based mainly on conscription, and his military 
reforms attempted to transform the utskrivning militia into a better trained offensive 
force. Although the mentality of a defensive militia remained in part, it had eroded 
enough that it would cease to be an issue under Gustavus Adolphus.
70
  
Gustavus Adolphus refined the utskrivning system as part of his broader reforms 
of the Swedish military and government. All male peasants, fifteen and older, became 
liable for conscription under the new utskrivning. The system divided men into groups, 
called rota, selected from lists drawn up by the local parson, from which the government 
would conscript one man. A commission consisting of a governor and the regimental 
colonel would supervise the choosing of the conscripts at a conscription meeting in the 
locality. While the local community could influence the selection, the commission chose 
the actual conscripts. It was at the conscription meeting that the commission would assess 
the number of eligible men and divide them into rotas. The commissioners were to 
conscript automatically persons without any apparent means of supporting themselves, 
vagrants and vagabonds, but were not supposed to enlist criminals. The conscripts chosen 
at the meeting had the option to pay another to take his place. This practice of paying a 
conscript substitute, the lega, was not uncommon. In the province of Ostrobothnia at the 
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conscription of 1673, substitutes made up seventy-one percent of conscripts from the 
southern part of the province.
71
  
The size of the rota was determined by the specific grant of conscription issued 
by the Riksdag that year, or sometimes via negotiation with the effected local population 
or a provincial meeting of the estates. The number of peasants drafted in each of the 
conscriptions would roughly correspond to the numbers needed to fill out losses from the 
newly established “provincial” regiments, although in wartime the number of men 
conscripted would go over this amount.
72
 As part of Gustavus Adolphus’ new reforms 
there were thirty permanent provincial regiments set up across the kingdom. Each 
regiment had a fixed area for conscription, meaning the troops raised for that regiment 
were from the same area. The boundaries of these recruiting areas for the regiments, and 
even companies, generally aligned with the normal administrative divisions of the 
kingdom. These new regiments had a fixed strength that the new conscription would 
maintain, 1,200 men in an infantry regiment and 1,000 men in a cavalry regiment, in total 
giving Sweden a standing army of forty thousand men.  
Once this system was set in place, utskrivning conscription was a common 
occurrence until replaced with the indelningsverk. Sweden’s war-making in the early and 
mid-parts of the seventeenth century required a steady input of manpower. From 1631 to 
1660, Sweden conscripted around 30,000 to 45,000 men per decade. At a minimum, the 
Swedish army was replacing three-fourths of the standing army every ten years, though 
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The response of the peasantry to the combination of heavy taxes and the steep 
manpower demands of the utskrivning was resistance but never outright rebellion. 
Despite their opposition, the peasantry continued to work with the Swedish state and 
there was consistent negotiation between the state and the localities over conscription. 
The peasantry’s continued dialog to alter the details of conscription, either through the 




The details of each particular conscription varied over time. The general standard 
was that the conscription of the noble peasants was at half the rate of the crown peasants 
or of the tax peasants: peasants that worked noble land, crown land, or were taxpaying 
freeholders respectively. The standard ratio was ten crown or tax peasants for every rota 
against twenty noble peasants in a rota, and out of each of these rota the government 
would choose one man. From 1627 to 1633, and again in 1657, noble peasants also had to 
form rota of ten men.
75
 The size of the rota changed as well. In 1635, it was fifteen 
crown or tax peasants in a rota to thirty noble peasants in a rota. In the later years of 
Queen Christina’s reign, the size of a rota was a seemingly more severe eight and sixteen 
respectively, but this was actually milder than earlier conscriptions. This was due to a 
change in the manner of forming the rota after 1642, now done by number of farms 
instead of individuals. This was not sufficient for the wars of Karl X Gustav, and he 
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returned to forming the rota by number of men, though in the Scanian War it would vary 
between number of farms or men.
76
  
The recruitment of the cavalry also had a basis in an older form, the medieval 
rusttjänst, or knight service. As codified in Magnus Eriksson’s Land Law, any freeman 
who presented himself to the king armed and equipped with both horse and armor to 
serve as a knight would gain a tax-exemption.
77
 By the sixteenth and seventeen centuries, 
the knights of the rusttjänst had evolved into a landed nobility that were quite adept at 
shirking their duty of knight-service. To ensure the supply of cavalry, Gustavus Adolphus 
selectively expanded the old system of knight-service beyond the nobility to those 
wealthy enough to support a cavalryman. Both these basic systems, the utskrivning and 
the rusttjänst, gave Sweden a solid core of soldiers to buttress the mercenary forces 
Sweden built up during the reigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Christina, and Karl X Gustav. 
The utskrivning system, for all that it allowed Sweden to accomplish in the 
sixteenth and seventeen centuries, had several fundamental flaws. What Karl XI saw in 
the Scanian War were faults that had existed for some time. For the state the utskrivning 
was unreliable and inconsistent, as it was dependent on conscripts of sometimes dubious 
quality and subject to the whim of a Riksdag grant. For the peasantry it had crippling 
social and financial consequences. Of the men conscripted out of Bygdeå parish in 
Västerbotten between 1620 and 1640, over eighty percent died.
78
 The practice of paying a 
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substitute to take a conscripted peasant’s place also put a great burden on the peasantry in 
some areas as the payment reached astronomical amounts. Some lega during the Thirty 
Years’ War reached as high as two hundred to three hundred daler kopparmynt (d. kmt), 
comparable to three to four years of taxes for a large home.
79
 These, of course greatly 
harmed the peasantry, but from the state’s perspective such practices were destructive as 
it could make farms unable to pay their taxes for years. 
Karl XI’s new conscription system built upon elements from the old systems, but 
recombined them into an effective new system that fundamentally changed the Swedish 
army. The basis of the indelningsverk concept was the permanent allocation of fixed 
revenues to specific expenditures, in this case peasants supporting soldiers.
80
 The first 
element of this system was a series of contracts individually negotiated with each locality 
to maintain their attached regiment at 1,200 men via the knekthåll system. Although this 
shares similarities with the old rusttjänst system, or Gustav Vasa supporting troops with 
parcels of land, this system’s direct lineage stems from Gustavus Adolphus. At the 
Riksdag in Nyköping in 1611, the Dalarna peasantry agreed to raise and maintain in 
peace and war 900 soldiers, increasing to 1,400 soldiers in 1614.
81
 Jämtland, Härjedalen, 
and Västerbotten would later also adopt this knekthåll system.
82
 Other provinces would 
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also adopt bits and pieces of this system, for example, all the regiments supported by 
Småland and Västergötland respectively would assign the soldiers farms. Uppland, 
Södermanland, Västmanland and Östergötland had a grain maintenance paid from the 
taxes of the church parishes.
83
 Whereas in the rusttjänst system a single wealthy 
individual would support a soldier, the knekthåll system remade the old rota, to serve a 
similar purpose.  
This new system transformed the rota from a collection of individuals into 
groupings of, on average, two to four farms.
84
 A significant part of this reform was 
integrating the soldier into the rota supporting them. In peacetime, the soldier could act 
as an additional farm hand to support the rota. In most provinces, the soldier would even 
gain his own plot of land and a cottage, drawn from the land owned by the rota.
85
 The 
new system quartered officers nearby their troops on farms, meant to support them at a 
level appropriate to their rank. Both officers and the soldiers under their command lived 
in a fixed area, the old provincial regiment system’s geographical nature moved 
downward to the company level and even smaller so that soldiers and their leaders lived 
in the same areas together. Multiple times a year soldiers and their officers went to 
regimental and unit training so that all soldiers were familiar with operating in their role 
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with their full unit. The indelningsverk repurposed more than just the rota. The old 
concept of paying a lega to hire a conscript substitute became a method to attract 
prospective soldiers to the rota’s service. The lega under the indelningsverk system was 
an enlistment bonus negotiated between the soldier and the farmers making up the rota. 
The flexibility of being able to negotiate the amount of the lega allowed the peasantry to 
respond to the real conditions of the labor market and entice a recruit from across their 
local area or in other areas of the kingdom.
86
 To prevent the damage that too high a lega 
could cause, there was a cap specific to the locality on the amount that the peasants could 
pay, or the soldier could demand. The system for recruiting cavalry remained largely the 
same as under Gustavus Adolphus, though now regularized under the auspices of a 
contract signed with each individual supporting farmer.
87
 With this system, Sweden had a 
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This system had numerous advantages for all parties involved. With the 
enticement of his own plot of land, the soldier, often drawn from the poorer elements of 
society, gained some stability for their own families and some upward mobility. The 
farmers in the rota, as long as they could find a soldier, received protection from the 
unpredictability of the old conscription system potentially drafting them, or members of 
their family. Under this system, the government effectively had a volunteer army 
composed of a generally higher quality of soldier. This was in part because the incentive 
structure for the rota was to find someone physically and morally fit enough that the rota 
would want that soldier to live and work with them, but also because of the strict 
recruiting standards set by Karl XI.
89
 It also served to protect the economically vital 
farmers that headed households and communities. The king now had a professional 
military force that was cheaper than mercenaries in wartime and self-supporting when 
Sweden was at peace.
90
 
As one of the central pillars of the indelningsverk, the knekthåll contracts served 
as a method for Karl XI to legitimize his conscription system. Each of the provinces in 
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Sweden and Finland individually negotiated with the king through their indelningsverk 
commissioners, their specific obligations under the knekthåll contracts. The king 
appointed his commissioners, usually the county governor of the specific area and the 
colonel of the regiment in that area along with other noblemen or bureaucrats, to act as 
his agents in these negotiations. They would assess local conditions and the peasantry’s 
opinions on those conditions, conduct the face-to-face negotiations with the peasantry, 
and once the contract was set, divide the farmers into their rotas. The details of how the 
system would operate were open to negotiation, with even the possibility of adjusting the 
overall manpower obligation. Some of these negotiations, such as in Uppland, concluded 
quickly, while others dragged along for several years. Both Småland and Finland had 
long periods of negotiation, and in both cases the negotiations concluded with a variety of 
different results. As Småland was a poor province, the local leadership wanted a 
reduction in its obligations. After three years of negotiation, the province secured an 
agreement that allowed them to set up their regiments with 1,100 men, as compared to 
the standard regiment of size of 1,200 in other Swedish provinces. The knekthåll 
contracts for the Finnish provinces were the most unusual break with the norm, taking 
over a decade to bring them into alignment with the indelningsverk system. Even then, 
they were subject to significantly altered obligations. 
Just as the negotiations of the knekthåll contracts were a natural continuation of 
the old Swedish tradition of building consensus, the different aspects of the contracts 
under negotiation were also continuations of much older ideas. The utskrivning built off 
the uppbåd and the indelningsverk took concepts formed under the utskrivning and 




rota, or the expansion of the association of military units with physical areas, to the lega 
which under both the utskrivning and the indelningsverk served as a way for a peasant to 
recruit a soldier. The indelningsverk was not an innovation. It was rather a systematic 
application of older ideas that had popular support and a strong track record into a form 





The Lega: A Total Reversal  
 
The lega, despite its long history under the utskrivning as a method of attracting 
recruits, was not initially a part of Karl XI’s new knekthåll system. The state and the 
peasantry had not forgotten the harm that it had done over the course of Sweden’s many 
long wars. The Riksdag contract of 1682 unambiguously prohibited the payment of an 
enlistment bonus, a lega, yet every single contract negotiated by Karl XI after the 
Riksdag contract would include specific provisions for paying one.
91
 The course of 
negotiating the lega portions of each contract was a process of consistent concessions and 
flexibility to local desires by the king. While he would dictate certain details, he 
fundamentally compromised the framework set out in the Riksdag contract. In the end, 
this initial framework would no longer exist in any knekthåll contract, and even the 
provinces that signed the Riksdag contract would negotiate to allow a lega. Yet Karl XI, 
despite his flexibility to the different local desires concerning the lega, always insured 
that his new system controlled the problems prevalent in the old system.
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What is notable about the abolition of the lega in the Riksdag contract was its 
broader context in relation to the specificity with which the Riksdag contract deals with 
it. The lega was a long-standing process that allowed peasants to protect themselves and 
their families from conscription. Although the knekthåll eliminated the threat of 
conscription, the peasants still had to find a soldier to fulfill their contractual obligation. 
A lega, negotiated with the prospective soldier to entice him from alternative 
employment, could have been an important way of achieving this. The disadvantage of 
allowing the lega was simple. Left unchecked, the lega could, and had, reduced peasants 
to such a state that they were unable to pay their taxes. In the context of the new knekthåll 
system, where the soldier was not just conscripted from the local populace, but recruited 
by a select group of peasants, the rota, an inordinately high lega could damage the future 
ability of the rota to recruit new soldiers, thus threatening the stability of the system 
overall.  
The Riksdag contract itself explicitly laid out reasons for abolishing the lega, 
specifically to prevent any damage or unnecessary burden on the peasantry. As a 
justification for the ban, the contract argued that having to pay an intolerable amount for 
a lega over a short period of time could harm the peasant and place an undue burden on 
him, particularly considering the risk that the soldier could simply run off with the 
money.
92
 On top of that, the contract pointed out that under the knekthåll system the 
soldiers would be receiving steady pay, housing, and other benefits that would offset the 
lack of a lega.
93
 Next, the contract dealt with the possible consequence of having no 
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ability to offer a lega by providing the peasants in a rota with the power to “recruit” any 
drifters or vagabonds they found.
94
 
According to Ågren, the introduction of this clause banning the lega was at the 
behest of the peasantry.
95
 Though Ågren does not mention what the king’s intentions 
were, within three months there was already a request from the peasantry to modify the 
contract, which Karl XI denied. The peasantry was to comply strictly with the contract. 
The totality of the ban would seem to indicate general agreement on the king’s part. A 
consensus agreement where the king had a radically different opinion would have found a 
result in the middle. Later negotiations have the king explicitly on the other side. At the 
behest of the peasantry, he was the one allowing the lega, albeit with a ceiling set by him.    
Despite the lega prohibition originating from the peasantry, the peasants that 
negotiated their contracts with the king after the Riksdag contract did not seem too keen 
on having that prohibition in their own contracts. In discussions with the commission for 
Älvsborg län in early 1684, the king approved a request from the peasantry for a mild 
lega in certain areas of their county. This concession was part of a general discussion on 
lowering the salary requirements for individual härad in the area. Excluded from this 
lega concession was Mark härad, which was the only district who stated their willingness 
to pay the full Riksdag contract salary.
96
 
Skaraborg län, the other county in the province of Västergötland aside from 
Älvsborg län, had itself received some concessions regarding the lega. Karl XI instructed 
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the commission in Älvsborg län to equalize their mild lega with that in their neighboring 
county, so all the regiments in the province would share the same lega.
97
 This unilateral 
step over the peasantry maintained the earlier concession of having a lega at all, but took 
the peasantry out of the discussion on the specific details. The discussions over the lega, 
however, were still ongoing.  
A month after the instructions to equalize the lega amounts, the king responded to 
a request for a fundamental departure from the previous agreement sent not by the 
peasantry of Älvsborg län, but the potential soldiers. These men announced they were 
willing to forgo any lega whatsoever for the freedom to negotiate their salary annually. 
The king was open to this option and instructed the commission to talk this over with the 
peasantry to discern their thoughts and opinions. In these discussions, the commissioners 
were to present the king’s concern with this proposal, that it would jeopardize the 
stability of the system. If the annual salary negotiations did not work out and the soldier 
departed without a replacement already lined up, the king foresaw a system so sporadic it 
would prevent the constant maintenance of a well-trained soldiery. Nevertheless, the king 
suggested the peasantry could maintain the quality of the soldiers under this new system 
if the soldiers were to stay in service for sixteen to twenty years.
98
   
In terms of the lega, it was the future prospective soldiers themselves who were 
asking for a return to the Riksdag framework, of course in return for a radical change to 
the method of paying salaries. Karl XI was not skeptical of the renunciation of a lega in 
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their proposal, but at the potential instability it would cause in the system for the peasants 
to have to negotiate a new salary every year. As long as the peasants could consistently 
maintain this new system, the king was willing to be flexible. The king charged the 
commission to discuss the weaknesses in the system rather than directly denying the 
request, an opening for future negotiations and allowance for the locality to weigh in on 
their preferred solution.  
The negotiations in Älvsborg län eventually settled on the amount of one hundred 
d. kmt for the maximum amount a rota could pay for a lega. This number was the same 
as Skaraborg län, and both placed a fine of forty mark silvermynt (m. smt) on those that 
paid a lega over this amount.
99
 In an earlier letter to the governor of Älvsborg län the 
king justified this amount as protecting the peasantry from inordinately high lega and 
mitigating the damage from recruits running off with the money.
100
 This justification 
harkens back to the initial reasoning stated in the Riksdag contract for banning the lega 
outright and carries forward the concern of the debilitating and destabilizing potential of 
an uncapped lega. The king also made it clear that the one hundred d. kmt cap did not 
oblige the rota to pay the full amount, and that they should negotiate both the lega and 
the details of its distribution with their recruit.
101
 
A few weeks earlier in a similar arrangement with Vangsbro härad in the 
province of Västmanland and Färnebo parish, which was in the province of Värmland, 
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the king proposed a max lega of one hundred d. kmt with the specific amount negotiated 
amongst the rota and the soldiers. The negotiations in these two different areas, in two 
separate provinces, had reached a similar result as Älvsborg län, albeit with an additional 
specification. Here a rota would pay the lega in instalments of twenty-five d. kmt 
annually until they paid off the full amount, rather than negotiating its distribution with 
the recruit like in Älvsborg län.
102
 
The negotiations over the lega in Småland also concluded with some local 
variation, but over a far more significant detail, the amount of the lega itself. With the 
exception of Småland and Finland, every other area in Sweden agreed to a maximum 
lega of one hundred d. kmt, even the provinces which signed the Riksdag contract would 
eventually come to this amount.
103
 In Småland the lega was set to 40 daler silvermynt (d. 
smt), equivalent to 120 d. kmt, twenty percent more than in these other provinces.
104
 The 
justification for this amount in Jönköping och Kronoberg län, one of the two counties in 
Småland, was the same as Älvsborg län, it was in fact an almost verbatim concern for 
large lega amounts and the risk of recruits running off with the money.
105
 There is no 
indication of why this amount was higher than in the other areas, although the king and 
the commissioners did repeatedly discuss the poverty of Småland in their 
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 Unlike Älvsborg län there is no suggestion of any request from the 
peasantry for a lega. Instead, the commissioners were responsible for the request. If the 
peasantry was involved in this appeal, it is not clear in this letter.
107
  
While other negotiations happening at the exact same time were settling upon one 
hundred d. kmt, Småland remained different. A letter to Älvsborg län the next week 
discussed setting the lega there at one hundred d. kmt, as in Skaraborg län.
108
 This was 
despite the attempt by the king to bring Småland into line with the rest of the provinces. 
In October 1684, a few months after Karl XI suggested the 120 d. kmt amount in a 
response to the commissioners’ request, the king directed the governor of Jönköping och 
Kronoberg län, Hans Georg Mörner, to introduce a lega of 100 d. kmt. In the preface to 
this instruction, the king remarked on having allowed the peasantry to pay the soldiers the 
reduced amount of seven or eight d. smt annually. Relief for the peasantry would come in 
the knowledge that the soldiers could not claim an intolerable lega as in the past. As the 
other län had a lega of one hundred d. kmt, the king thought this was best and instructed 
the introduction of this amount in Småland.
109
 In this instance, the king’s opinion, and 
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instructions, were not the conclusion of this negotiation.
 
A lega of 120 d. kmt was the 
final amount agreed to in the contracts for the counties of Småland.
110
 
The other areas to have a substantially different lega were the three counties in 
Finland.
111
 In a joint message, a letter to the governor of Nyland och Tavastehus län and 
a proclamation to the people of the county, the king replied to the request of the peasantry 
concerning a number of issues relating to the knekthåll, one of which was the lega.
112
 
Addressing all the parishes in Nyland, the king affirmed their request that, due to the 
disproportionate burden falling on Nyland, the whole of Nyland och Tavastehus län 
should jointly raise the first lega payments for the initial raising of the regiments. He 
agreed to the peasantry’s proposal for a moderated lega, setting it to fifty d. kmt, paid 
over two years at a rate of half per year.
113
 In granting the peasants specific request 
concerning the first lega payments, the king was adapting to the local inequality 
discovered through this process of dialog. Karl XI resolved the matter by settling on the 
peasant’s requested lega rather than the one hundred d. kmt favored by him, the firmly 
established standard everywhere other than Småland and Finland.  
The fine for paying over the maximum lega discussed in these documents, as with 
the other post 1682 Riksdag contracts, was forty m. smt. All the counties in both Finland 
and Småland had a forty m. smt fine despite their differing lega amounts, leading to the 
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fine being quite different in proportion to the max lega it was meant to enforce. In the 
case of Småland the fine was equivalent to a quarter of the maximum lega the rota was 
allowed to pay, whereas in Finland the punishment was much steeper with the offenders 
having to pay over half the amount of the max lega they would have paid if they 
complied with the contract.
114
  
Åbo och Björneborg län similarly moved towards a lega of fifty d. kmt. Here, 
however, the governor rather than the peasantry proposed this amount.
115
 This request, 
the answer of which the king tacked on the last line in a letter addressing a different 
matter, was to have a greater significance in the negotiations with Nyland och Tavastehus 
län. 
This influence came in the form of Karl XI’s response to a draft of the contract for 
Nyland och Tavastehus län.
116
 The king provided his feedback, opinions, desired 
clarifications, and amendments to the governor in this letter, including three rewritten 
clauses to replace those from the draft contract. In this letter Karl XI’s intentions come 
through in his detailed response to the draft contract. 
The section of this letter discussing the lega was a response to a specific request 
from the peasantry. Addressing this, the king directed the governor to reconcile with the 
peasantry on the soldier’s lega, and for him to “proportionate it after the Country’s 
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 However, the governor was not to do this in a manner that obliged 
the rota to pay the lega all at once, but rather divided across several terms. Following 
these instructions on how the governor was to proceed in the negotiations, the king next 
directed the governor to request a specific sum for the lega in the county in his 
negotiations. Here the king cited the fifty d. kmt lega in Åbo och Björneborg län, and 
argued that the lega in Nyland och Tavastehus län should be the same, on the grounds of 
the two counties similarity in terms of their division into rotas. The king completed his 
directives by giving the governor permission to negotiate, and instructed him to see on 
what schedule the peasantry wished to pay the lega.
118
    
 In the context of earlier negotiations with Nyland och Tavastehus län, this letter 
would seem to be redundant. The king already agreed to the peasantry’s proposal for him 
to moderate the lega, set there at fifty d. kmt with a specified payment schedule of half 
per year over two years.
119
 Kamppinen’s explanation for this was that the draft contract 
missed specifying the lega amount.
120
 Conversely, this could indicate that the amount 
Karl XI gave in his earlier communication with Nyland och Tavastehus län was not fully 
accepted. Hence, the king’s call for negotiation and him providing to the governor an 
argument that the neighboring county had decided on this amount. The king instructed his 
agent to reintroduce, and argue for, the previously determined sum to get the peasantry to 
enter into an agreement with him and legitimize an amount. In an effort to reconcile with 
the peasantry and find a consensus solution, Karl XI was reentering the push-and-pull of 
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negotiations. A process in which the peasantry could legitimize Karl XI’s number, and 
the governor, as per the king’s instructions, could seek from the peasantry a number that 
was proportionate to the nature of the locality. 
The negotiations over the lega in the various knekthåll contracts resulted in a total 
reversal of the Riksdag contract ban, and yet achieved the same objective. By instituting a 
cap on the amount a peasant could pay for a lega and working to set up systems to 
distribute the burden of the lega across wider groups or over time, Karl XI created 
protections against the bankrupting effects that had been so destabilizing in the past. 
These protections were not uniform, despite the king’s instance on a standardized lega 
amount in both Småland and Finland he compromised. In Småland it was twenty d. kmt 
over the standard one hundred d. kmt, while in Finland it was only fifty d. kmt total. Karl 
XI listened to the peasantry’s desire for a lega and negotiated from a position that would 
address the issues outlined in the Riksdag contract while allowing the peasantry a tool to 
respond to local labor markets and get the king his new recruits more efficiently. It 
incentivized the rota to use their local knowledge of the labor market to negotiate on the 
state’s behalf: to utilize their intimate knowledge to protect themselves and 
simultaneously the state. The results of the lega portion of the knekthåll contract 
negotiations were a decisive reversal, but compared to the negotiations over the soldiers’ 





The Soldier’s Payment: A Variety of Compromises 
 
The negotiation of the soldier’s payment portions of the knekthåll contracts 
resulted in a wide range of different compromises from the king. Over these negotiations, 
Karl XI was consistent in responding to local conditions as his agents or the peasantry 
informed him of them. Unlike the negotiations over the lega where concession was 
almost immediate and universal, the negotiations over the soldier’s payment was a far 
more diverse process. Different areas may have arrived at similar results but they each 
had different ways of getting there.  
The salary for the soldier set in the Riksdag contract was thirty-five d. kmt 
annually. Additionally the rota was to provide food and clothing for the soldier.
121
 
Kamppinen notes that most of the later contracts would stipulate exactly what kind of 
clothing the rota was to provide, be it the uniform or the work clothes the soldier would 
have used working on the plot of land provided by the rota.
122
 Unlike the section of the 
Riksdag contract regarding the lega, there was no justification provided or strong 
language concerning the decision. The contract simply stated the stipulations with no 
added commentary. However, as with the lega, Karl XI would deviate significantly in
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future negotiations from this framework, both in the specifications for the salary and the 
intertwined requirements for providing clothing. 
 The negotiations over the soldier’s payment in Älvsborg län immediately started 
out with a concession from the standard set in the Riksdag contract. Jointly addressing the 
governor and the people of Valbo härad and the province of Dalsland, via a letter and a 
resolution respectively, the king expressed his pleasure that the peasantry of the areas 
have asked to come under the knekthåll.
123
 After specifying his desire for the peasantry to 
raise 1,200 men for their regiment, over which the commission was to negotiate with 
them, the king declared that for the peasantry’s relief he would cover part of the soldier’s 
clothing. The peasantry would still have to provide the soldier’s work clothing, but the 
king would take on the responsibility for the soldier’s uniform.
124
 Though Karl XI had 
opened the negotiations with a concession, it was a strategic one, placed immediately 
following his sole request for the peasantry to negotiate to fulfil the core goal of 1,200 
men in a regiment. 
The use of offering a concession on clothing to further the king’s wider goals in 
the negotiations persists in a letter to the governor of Skaraborg län, the other county in 
Västergötland aside from Älvsborg län. The king sent this letter in response to a request 
for relief from the peasantry in the five districts of Skåning, Laske, Viste, Åse, and 
Kålland. All of these districts suffered from bad soil that made them more prone to crop 
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failure during a drought. In response to this request, the king informed the governor that 
he would assume the burden of supplying the soldier’s uniform so that the districts would 
be more inclined to adopt the knekthåll.
125
 The governor, who Karl XI had previously 
instructed to work towards convincing his county to set up the knekthåll, now had a 
compromise he could offer the peasantry as a bargaining chip.
126
 From a wider 
perspective, this letter also exhibits the information gathering potential of dialog and 
negotiation to the state. Through this appeal, the peasantry in a handful of localities made 
known their local weakness to the state. Negotiation had revealed a problem and Karl XI 
proposed a solution. A solution that provided a potential correction to a problem that 
could threaten the stability of the system in the locality along with building legitimacy 
and consensus. However, even if that fix was not strong enough, the negotiations were 
still ongoing.  
A month after this discussion on the clothing component of the soldier’s payment, 
the king responded to a query on if the salary should be thirty-five d. kmt. In response, 
the king gave permission to the governor of Skaraborg län to negotiate the soldiers’ 
salary. The king instructed the governor to do what was best in the locality for the 
system’s security as well as the peasantry’s prosperity, pointing out that the governor was 
in the best position to perceive how to do this.
127
 The king admitted that he could not 
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precisely determine beforehand when the peasantry should pay the salary, and told the 
soldiers and peasants to find agreement amongst themselves on this issue.
128
 This was a 
direct delegation to the peasantry, being indifferent on the details, but was overall an 
admission by Karl XI that he did not have, and did not need to have, all the information 
and make all the decisions. Included with the letter, by request of the governor, was a 
copy of the Riksdag contract. Despite the inclusion of the Riksdag contract, the king told 
the governor to ignore this framework; the peasantry in each locality was to come 
together to decide on how they wanted the knekthåll in their area.
129
 This final comment 
colors the earlier permission to negotiate, directing the governor to use his local position 
to assess how to adapt the system to be stable in the locality, and at the same time to step 
away from the framework and negotiate to achieve consensus on the system’s specific 
implementation in that locality. 
Älvsborg län went down a similar path in terms of the salary negotiations. The 
peasantry in the county had been in discussion with the commission and expressed their 
opinions and requests on the subject, which the commission communicated to the king.
130
 
Mark härad had expressed their willingness to pay the full Riksdag contract salary of 
thirty-five d. kmt, to which the king agreed. The poverty of Kuling härad was significant 
enough to warrant the king reducing its salary obligation to eight d. smt, equivalent to 
twenty-four d. kmt. This was expressly to ensure that the district could afford to provide 
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the soldier a residence. Finally, Karl XI requested that the rest of the districts unite to 
give the soldiers a salary of thirty d. kmt.
131
 Moreover, the king directed the governor to 
establish a discourse with Skaraborg län, so that there could be similarity between both 
counties in terms of the thirty d. kmt salary.
132
  
Evident in the Riksdag contract was the interrelation between the salary and 
clothing component of the soldier’s payment. A response by the king to the governor of 
Skaraborg län demonstrates a change in the division of the soldier’s payment that drew 
these two components together as part of a wider concession.
133
 The governor had 
informed the king that despite his best efforts, the peasantry in his county were convinced 
that the collective åttingar (administrative subdivisions of a härad) of the province would 
help pay for the soldier’s salary. Here Karl XI conceded to them, but he laid out the 
specific amounts that each group would pay, stating that this would further the system’s 
security as well as provide relief to the peasantry. Essentially, the king agreed to the 
request for the peasantry to work with the åttingar for the payment of the salary, 
specifying that the soldier should not get more than thirty d. kmt. The rota would provide 
twenty-six d. kmt and the åttingar four d. kmt. The peasantry was also to provide work 
clothes as well as shoes and stockings for the soldiers, though the king agreed to their 
request for him to cover the cost of hats. The king noted that the cost of the shoes and 
stockings almost compares to the five additional d. kmt soldiers in other provinces were 
receiving as part of their salary. Even though Karl XI laid out these specific figures, he 
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subordinated them to the peasantry’s opinions. He went on to state that, nevertheless, the 
peasantry should give out nothing more than they can agree and unite around.
134
 
Both counties in Västergötland, Skaraborg län and Älvsborg län, ended up with 
the same results in terms of the amount of soldier’s payment. The peasantry in Skaraborg 
län agreed to pay twenty d. kmt for the salary, with an additional five d. kmt in work 
clothing.
135
 As for Älvsborg län, the contract for the peasantry specified the salary as 
twenty d. kmt, with five d. kmt on top of that to cover work clothing, paid every quarter 
whether the soldier was at home or away.
136
 The similarity in terms of specification of the 
monetary cost of the clothing carried over into the finer details. In both counties, the king 
provided the soldier’s uniform and firearm. The soldier, on the other hand, was 
responsible for the assembly, or paying for the assembly, of his uniform.
137
 For its part, 
the rota was only to give the soldier shoes and stockings once every three years, or as 
often as the king provided new uniforms.
138
 At least in Älvsborg län, the soldier was at 
his own expense to equip himself with accouterments and weapons.
139
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In the province of Småland, the negotiations progressed similarly to those in 
Västergötland, albeit for different reasons. Karl XI, in a letter to the commission in 
Småland concerning the establishment of the knekthåll in Jönköping och Kronoberg län, 
addressed the commission’s belief that the province was too weak to support the king’s 
desired number of soldiers for the province. The king responded to their belief by 




The commission argued that the weakness of Småland was such that to get 1,200 
men in a regiment, each rota would only be able to consist of one and a half farms. They 
compared this to the other provinces, which they claimed had rotas made up of  two and 
a half farms, or at a minimum two and a quarter. Besides, the farms in Småland, 
according to the commission, were of poor condition and in large part operated by 
widows and womenfolk. This they contended would cause uncertainty and risk when it 
came time to replace any soldiers who had died or retired. In response, the king voiced 
his opinion that the peasantry in Småland had several advantages in their favor, namely 
that they had rich forests, abundant farms, and ample manpower. He further pointed out 
that he had already granted the peasantry relief in the form of supplying the soldier’s 
uniform.
141
 Upon noting these points, Karl XI offered a further concession. He reduced 
the requirement for the number of soldiers in the three Småland regiments.
142
 Despite 
already having conceded the cost of the soldier’s uniforms, Karl XI respected the advice 
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of his local agents, who argued that the province was too weak to support reliably the 
king’s goal of 1,200 men in a regiment.  
A different concern, other than the weakness of the province, developed alongside 
these negotiations, a concern that forced the king to modify his positions. In a letter to the 
governor of Kalmar län, the other county in Småland, the king stated that the soldier’s 
salary in the county should be thirty d. kmt. Even though this was a reduction from the 
Riksdag contract framework, the intention of this pronouncement was not to address the 
weakness of the province.
143
 Rather, the king’s aim was to protect the recruitment of the 
cavalry. His objective was to equalize the wage between the two as to not make the 
position of infantryman disproportionately appealing.
144
  
This concern persisted in a letter sent six months later by Karl XI to the governor 
of Kalmar län.
145
 It had come to the king’s attention that the differential in the salary 
between infantryman and cavalryman was significant enough that cavalrymen were 
seeking dismissal to join the infantry. Indeed, the disruption on the local labor market 
from this inordinately high wage was causing problems in other areas, so much so that 
the king perceived this as harming him as well as the whole county. To address this 
problem the king proposed a salary for the knekthåll infantry in Kalmar län of twenty d. 
kmt and five d. kmt for work clothing, the same as in Västergötland.
146
 Karl XI argued 
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that the soldiers should be satisfied with this amount as the local cost of living and the 
prevailing wage rate in the county was lower than “up here.”
147
   
The king also sent a letter on the same date, October 10, 1684, to the governor of 
Jönköping och Kronoberg län, wherein he instructed the salary to be set to twenty d. kmt 
and five d. kmt for work clothing.
148
 Two weeks later in a similar letter, the king 
indicated his desire for a decrease in salary to a comparable, albeit different, level. This 
reduction was not as specific, with the king instructing the governor to reduce the salary 
to seven or eight d. smt, twenty-one to twenty-four d. kmt.
149
 How the governor was to 
choose between the two amounts the king did not stipulate. During the finalization of the 
contract for the county, the king, seemingly frustrated with the lack of progress on the 
matter, told the governor that the salary was “clearly and apparently set” in his letter of 
the October 10, 1684.
150
 The governor was to insert this amount into the contract, and 
communicate to the peasantry the king’s approval of the contract. As to the matter of 
clothing, Karl XI took upon himself the expense of providing the soldier’s uniforms.
151
  
The poverty of Finland also shaped the negotiations over the soldier’s payment in 
the three Finnish counties. This problem was of particular concern to Karl XI as it 
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affected his ability to achieve his goal of one thousand men in each of the six Finnish 
regiments. During one communication with the governors of Finland on how they could 
best establish the knekthåll in Finland to attain the six thousand man total, the king laid 
out the number of farms in each county. He pointed out that the areas of Åbo and Nyland 
did not appear secure with only the usual two farms per rota to support a soldier, 
particularly if any individual weak farm inside the rota faced a disproportionate 
burden.
152
 Similarly, for Viborg och Nyslott län the king expressed concern at what the 
governor there had communicated to him, that the already established rotas in the county 
were too small and weak.
153
 Moreover, as the king observed, the burden that could come 
from such a distribution could cause peasants to flee across the borders to Kexholm or 
Russia. 
In light of this, Karl XI offered to provide the full annual salary of the soldiers for 
relief of the peasantry in the knekthåll. As to the amount of this salary, the king opined 
that it should not be as great as in Sweden, as the cavalryman’s salary in Finland was not 
over six d. kmt annually, at least as far it was known to the king. The rota was still to 
replace any soldiers that departed or died, and maintain the soldier’s residence. Work 
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clothing was to remain the responsibility of the rota, as the king reasoned the soldier 
would be working for them.
154
  
A year later in August 1693 Karl XI was still addressing the same issues with his 
agents. The poverty of Finland was simply too much of an obstacle for the knekthåll to 
overcome while maintaining stability without optimization. In discussing this difficulty 
with the governor of Åbo och Björneborg län, after laying out new estimates of farms in 




With both the lega and the soldier’s payment, their salary and their clothing, the 
king made significant concessions from the Riksdag contract framework. The strict 
prohibition of the lega in the Riksdag contract did not survive into any future contract, 
and even the areas that did accept the Riksdag contract had that provision replaced with 
one that allowed them to offer a lega. Småland and Finland, both ended up with their own 
specific amounts allowed for their lega payments.  
Karl XI also compromised on the soldier’s payment aspect of the contracts. Every 
one of the post Riksdag contract agreements had to pay ten d. kmt less in salary, twenty-
five d. kmt total as compared to thirty-five d. kmt specified in the Riksdag contract. In 
three areas of Nyland och Tavastehus län, Åbo och Björneborg län, and Värmland the 
king agreed to pay the whole salary himself.
156
 Factoring in the clothing concessions this 
was even less, as five d. kmt of that twenty-five d. kmt went to providing clothing, 
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something that the areas signing the Riksdag contract had to pay in addition to the usual 
salary. Likewise, the king agreed to take on the provision of the uniform in most of these 
areas as well. The negotiations over the lega and the soldier’s payment were a process of 
compromising the standards set in the Riksdag contract framework. In no place did Karl 
XI maintain this Riksdag contract baseline, however committed to it he was. Rather in 
both cases the process of negotiation, be it in dialog with the peasantry or the king’s 
agents, reduced the obligations on the peasantry. These negotiations resulted in a number 
of diverse outcomes for the different localities, each following its own path of dialog that 





The Number of Soldiers in a Regiment: The Central Goal 
 
The area where Karl XI was least interested in diverse outcomes was his foremost 
goal of 1,200 soldiers per Swedish regiment and 1,000 men in each of the Finnish 
regiments. Nevertheless, even here the king was flexible. His objective was to get the 
number of soldiers he desired and the other details, including aspects of the soldier’s 
payment, were secondary. As the king opened negotiations regarding this issue he 
followed a similar pattern and theme, prioritizing his goal for the number of soldiers in a 
regiment while remaining flexible on other matters to help him attain that objective.  
The first clause of the Riksdag contract declared that the peasantry would 
maintain a regiment of 1,200 men, in return for an exemption from conscription.
157
 The 
signatories of the Riksdag contract, the provinces of Närke, Uppland, Södermanland, 
Östergötland and Västergötland, all pledged to firmly maintain this number of soldiers. 
Indeed, the first clause was not even the first place in the Riksdag contract to mention the 
1,200 man number. The preamble of the Riksdag contract explained that the authorized 
representatives of the peasantry presented to the king an alternative method of 
recruitment aside from the utskrivning. This method, an assured knekthåll after the
                                                             




number of farms, would be an easier burden as well as better serving the kingdom. In 
such a manner, the provinces that agreed to this contract would always maintain the 
king’s regiments at 1,200 men.
158
 The Riksdag contract made no mention of the Finnish 
regiments, or their lesser requirement of one thousand soldiers. Nevertheless, the Riksdag 
did discuss the matter. Though even before then, the king had decided the Finnish 
regiments would have this lesser obligation.
159
  
Ågren, in remarking upon the importance of this goal to Karl XI, cites a specific 
instance in early 1683 immediately after the signing of the Riksdag contract. Virserum 
parish in Kalmar län asked to switch from the utskrivning to knekthåll after their local 
Riksdag member brought it to them. He also presented it to another härad, both agreed 
and on February 22, 1683 they sent a request to come under the knekthåll to the king. By 
February 27, the king issued a resolution to the peasants of Kalmar län, rejecting the 
request for the knekthåll based on two farms supporting a single soldier, referring to the 
fact that there were not enough farms in the county to reach 1,200 soldiers. The king went 




As other areas began to request to enter into the knekthåll, Karl XI gave similar 
responses. In six different letters to five different districts in Älvsborg län, the king 
repeated many of the same core points, but always a sole request, that he get 1,200 men 
in a regiment. Of these letters, two were directly to the people, each sent to a separate 
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district, Kind härad and Mark härad.
161
 The other four letters were two pairs of joint 
letters. The first letter in each pair went to the people in a specific area, the first going to 
Valbo härad and Dalsland with the second to both Ås and Veden härad. The second 
letter in each of these pairs went to the governor over the individual areas, in both cases 
the governor of Älvsborg län.
162
 These letters are overall different in their minutia, 
nevertheless they as a group share several central repetitions. All of these letters came 
from localities smaller than their county, the area that was ostensibly negotiating and 
signing the contracts.  
Among the king’s only request for 1,200 men in these letters were calls for 
negotiation or a delegation of certain issues to local decision making. In the letters to 
Kind härad, Mark härad, as well as Valbo härad and Dalsland Karl XI explicitly called 
upon the peasantry to negotiate their entrance into the knekthåll.
163
 In both letters to 
Valbo härad and Dalsland, the letter to the peasantry and the letter to the governor of 
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Älvsborg län, the king instructed the governor and one of his agents to come to an 
agreement with the peasantry, and further for the peasantry’s relief he would cover the 
cost of the soldier’s uniforms.
164
 The letter to the governor addressed two other issues, 
presumably brought up by the peasantry, related to the knekthåll. The king did not bring 
up either issue in the letters he sent concurrently to the peasantry. The king dealt directly 
with these two questions from the peasantry by issuing specific directives, the first 
leaving the problem to the peasantry and the soldiers to figure out the details themselves 
and the second granting the request of the peasantry.
165
 Taken together, the three issues 
regarding the knekthåll in this letter were all resolved in a call for negotiation, delegation 
of the issue for the peasantry to decide, or outright concession.  
The letters to Mark härad as well as Ås and Veden härad each contained an issue 
on which Karl XI delegated the decision making to the peasantry. The king allowed the 
local peasantry’s preference to be the deciding factor on how to perform the division of 
the districts into rotas.
166
 Karl XI requested that the peasantry reconcile amongst 
themselves on the manner of this division. In the case of Ås and Veden härad, the king 
additionally directed the governor to allow the peasantry to do this to their “best and 
comfort.”
167
 In the response to Valbo härad and Dalsland, the king granted the request of 
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the peasantry concerning this issue. He allowed them to divide into rotas in their 
requested manner, and they were to negotiate the details.
168
  
The one item that each of these opening of negotiations letters had was the sole 
demand from the king for 1,200 men in a regiment. Karl XI reinforced the paramount 
nature of this goal in the letter to the governor of Älvsborg län relating to the knekthåll in 
Valbo härad and Dalsland. The king twice reiterated that it was his intention to secure 
1,200 men in the regiment, both opening and closing his message to the governor on that 
same point: reminding the governor that the foundation of his negotiations was to get the 
king his 1,200 men.
169
 In fact, in four of the letters, the phrasing was in much the same 
vein as the letter to Virserum parish in Kalmar län, that the king would allow them to 
enter the knekthåll, if only they could fill the regiment to the full 1,200 men.
170
 In three of 
these letters, Karl XI predicated the call for negotiation on his demand for 1,200 men. 
The peasants could negotiate their entrance into the knekthåll so long as they met the 
king’s manpower goal.
171
 After the core goal of 1,200 men in a regiment, all the other 
details were up for negotiation.    
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These six letters all fulfill the same role, they were the initial response from Karl 
XI to a locality asking to enter the knekthåll, and all of them, despite being different in 
the minutiae, were in terms of substance nearly identical. The constant repetition by the 
king in these opening of negotiations letters was his first, and only, request, that the 
peasantry provide 1,200 men. In all six of these letters, be they to the local government or 
the people, there was no difference. The king’s only request was for 1,200 men. 
Following this request was always some call for negotiation or delegation to the 
peasantry to decide the details of the system in their area: for the peasantry to mediate 
and agree amongst themselves on the specifics. There was no demand for, or even 
mention of, any other aspect of the Riksdag contract such as the soldier’s payment. 
Across these letters, Karl XI actively conceded other minor aspects of the contract 
negotiations to achieve his primary goal, delegating the decision-making on minor 
subjects to the peasantry if only they would provide the men he desired. Here he set a 
hard bargaining line that he would stick to in the future negotiations over the knekthåll 
contracts. Each of these letters reinforces that the number of soldiers in a regiment was 
Karl XI’s foremost objective, an objective that Karl XI would compromise in the 





The Number of Soldiers in Småland: Compromising the Goal 
 
What becomes evident in the contract negotiations for Småland was that 
predicating Karl XI’s goal for the number of soldiers in a regiment was a desire for 
consistency. Karl XI wanted a stable knekthåll system that could reliably maintain and 
provide soldiers for the Swedish military. In the negotiations over the number of soldiers 
in the three regiments raised by Småland the king compromised in many areas and in the 
end did not get the number of soldiers he started out arguing for. He chose instead to 
adapt the system to the reality on the ground. The king started out fighting for his desired 
1,200 men in each regiment, but over the course of the negotiations modified his 
negotiating positions and made concessions in a wide range of areas. With strategic 
concessions he sought to maximize what he could get towards his central objective even 
as he modified that objective downwards.   
In a joint message to the peasantry and ståthållare (steward) in Kalmar län, one of 
the two Småland counties, the king communicated his general approval to the request of 






 As with the six letters opening negotiations in Älvsborg län and 
Dalsland, they contained the same call upon the peasantry to negotiate as well as the 
singular demand from the king for 1,200 men in a regiment. This general approval was 
conditional, however. The county, according to the king’s information, could not support 
the full 1,200 men at two farms per soldier as the peasantry had specifically requested.
173
 
The king made no mention of the fact that he was effectively overruling this ratio of two 
farms supporting one soldier, which stemmed from the Riksdag contract, in order to get 
1,200 men in a regiment.
174
 Thus, the king told the steward to communicate and explain 
this to the peasantry. The king was inclined to negotiate with the peasantry over their 
request to enter the knekthåll, so long as they could come together and reconcile amongst 
themselves to keep the regiment at the full number of 1,200 men.
175
 This communication 
to the whole of Kalmar län was in essence the same as the king’s message specifically to 
Virserum parish sent on the same date.
176
 In both these statements to the peasantry, Karl 
XI pushed for the full 1,200 men in spite of the previously accepted standard of two 
farms supporting one soldier, and for the peasantry to find this number using negotiation 
and building consensus amongst themselves.   
Even a year later, these negotiations had not progressed significantly. 
Consequently, the king sent a letter to the governor of Kalmar län informing him that the 
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nobility and the peasantry of Jönköping och Kronoberg län, the other county in Småland, 
had decided to adopt the knekthåll. From this, the king proposed to the governor that the 
people of Kalmar län, in seeing their neighbors undergo the same process, would be more 
open to the system.
177
 Therefore, the king instructed the governor to communicate to the 
peasantry and the nobility of his county that if they did not adopt the knekthåll like the 
other county in their province, or the other provinces, they would always be subject to the 
trouble and expense of the utskrivning.
178
 This was nothing more than a reminder of the 
reality of the situation. If they were not in the knekthåll then they were still in the old 
utskrivning system. In these two points, Karl XI was presenting to the governor a pair of 
arguments he could bring to the negotiations with the peasantry. As simple as they were, 
Karl XI was adding to his agent’s repertoire of negotiating tactics. After providing this 
advice, the king asked the governor to let him know what the peasantry’s explanations 
and opinions were when the governor presented this information to them.
179
  
In late December 1683, Karl XI ordered the governor of Jönköping och 
Kronoberg län to meet and consult with the peasantry and nobility in the county on the 
conditions on which they wanted to adopt the knekthåll.
180
 In the governor’s response, he 
explained that the nobility wished to maintain their traditional conscription privileges. 
They wanted their peasants to have twice as many farms supporting a single soldier as 
that of the rest of the peasantry, as it was under the utskrivning. The rest of the peasantry 
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in the county expressed mixed opinions, though generally in the same vein. Some of the 
districts in the county requested generally that there not be too few farms assigned to 
support each soldier. Others offered more specific requests, such as two to three farms 
per soldier or that the king give them the same conditions as in Östergötland. As 
Östergötland was one of the provinces that signed onto the Riksdag contract, their 
contractual baseline was two farms per soldier, though the reality might have been 
somewhat different. Some of the peasantry even declared their support for one and a half, 
even “one and eight-eighths,” farms per soldier.
181
  
According to Ågren, Karl XI formed the commission for Småland based on this 
answer.
182
 It was because of the commission’s report that in February 1684 the king 
compromised his core goal of 1,200 men for the province of Småland.
183
 The commission 
had found that the number of farms in Småland was not great enough to maintain the 
system. While other provinces had over two farms per soldier, they could only achieve 
the king’s numbers at a ratio of one and a half farms per soldier. Besides, these farms 
were of a particularly weak nature as it was. A reduced ratio of farms here would be 
unusually deleterious to the steady maintenance of the system. Karl XI then pointed to 
countervailing factors. Småland had good forest resources, and in terms of numbers at 
least, an abundance of farms and manpower.
184
 The province had more resources than 
met the eye. The King was touching on the simple fact that an abundance of manpower 
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meant that the labor market had more men who could be soldiers, and that greater 
competition could lead to more affordable recruits. Karl XI pointed out that he had 
already provided the peasantry with some relief by having taken upon himself to supply 
the soldier’s uniforms. After this the king suggested to the peasantry that they unite 
together as rotas and jointly arrange to support each other when it came time to replace 
the soldier, thus distributing the burden of the lega.
185
 
After providing these counter points to both the commission and the peasantry to 
bring them around to accepting his position, Karl XI adjusted his own negotiating 
position. The commission had argued in their letter to the king that for the better 
assurance and resiliency of the knekthåll, as well as for a reasonable similarity with the 
other provinces, that he reduce his demands. They requested that the king reduce the 
number of soldiers in the each of the three Småland regiments to 1,100 men.
186
 The king 
instead offered to reduce the number of men in each of the regiments by around fifty, so 
long as the system could otherwise come to a good outcome.
187
 Ågren observes that the 
commissioners seemed to have taken this as a complete endorsement of their numbers.
188
  
Even with this concession, Karl XI continued his vigorous pursuit of achieving 
his numbers goal, although now a lower number. In Kalmar län the negotiations 
continued with the king trying to get as many soldiers out of the county as he could. By 
this point in the negotiations, the number of soldiers the king expected Kalmar län 
specifically to support was well under 1,100 men. As with other regiments, the county 
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was to maintain only part of its own regiment. Jönköping och Kronoberg län would cover 
the rest to bring the regiment up to the full 1,100 men. Indeed, the number Karl XI was so 
strenuously trying to get Kalmar län to support was only 530 soldiers.
189
  
The commission in Kalmar län had informed the king that they did not believe the 
county could attain this number. In response to this, the king expressed his concern at the 
weakness of the farms that were to support the knekthåll in the county. He argued it 
would place an undue burden on the peasantry and leave the system insecure: if the rotas 
were all weak, the system would not last.
190
 To rectify this, the king first directed the 
commission to discuss the issue with the governor of Jönköping och Kronoberg län, and 
inquire with him as to the basis and conditions of the knekthåll under him. Second, the 
king proposed that for the relief of the peasantry, so they would be able to raise the full 
number, he would take on both the cost of clothing the soldiers as well as providing their 
salaries.
191
 Karl XI offered full concessions in both of these two different areas of the 
Riksdag contract framework, though it still left the peasantry to provide the soldier’s 
residence, food, and lega.  
In a letter discussing the draft contract for Jönköping och Kronoberg län, the 
number of soldiers for all of the counties in Småland finalized the 1,100 men per 
regiment.
192
 The obligation of Kalmar län specifically was 350 soldiers, though the final 
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contract amount would be 347.
193
 In a separate letter, the king instructed the governor of 
Kalmar län to work with the peasantry in the county to make their contract similar to the 
contract of Jönköping och Kronoberg län.
194
 
The weakness of Småland forced Karl XI to adjust his negotiating position to the 
reality of the resources in the locality. The king had already conceded the cost of 
providing the soldier’s uniform to the peasantry to help make the 1,200 man number 
more agreeable. In spite of that, the king modified that very goal at the commission’s 
insistence that the province could not reliably maintain 1,200 men in a regiment. Karl XI 
had adjusted the core goal to achieve more closely the number of two farms per soldier. 
This ratio was not just what the commissioners had stated was usual in the other 
provinces. It was what the peasantry had offered both initially and when, at the king’s 
insistence, the governor asked them under what conditions they wanted to accept the 
knekthåll.
195
 Whatever the peasantry’s negotiating position had stemmed from, a genuine 
expression of what they could offer, or a testing of what they could get away with, it was 
their assessment the king favored.
196
  
Now set upon a new goal, Karl XI vociferously defended it by offering significant 
concessions. Though even here the matter the king was addressing was two-fold, for his 
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stated impetus for his suggestion and concession was that the weakness of the farms in 
Kalmar län could leave the system insecure.
197
 Yet, between the two options, the number 
of soldiers and the stability of the system, which did the king choose? The final contract 
amount for the county was 347 soldiers.
198
 The king had already lowered his expectations 
for Småland when confronted with the province’s weakness.
199
 He had presented the 
peasantry with better conditions than any other county in the whole kingdom, but in the 
end, it was Karl XI who sacrificed his goal of securing his desired number of soldiers.  
This process of the king making offers, receiving insight from his agents or the 
peasantry, then modifying his negotiating positions, happened continually in the 
negotiations over the number of soldiers in Småland. The negotiations were a constant 
back and forth process of testing by the king. He had started with a hard stance against 
two farms per soldier to see if he could get more soldiers, he had even conceded covering 
the cost of uniforms.
200
 Karl XI asked for more soldiers while hiding what his real 
priorities were, to see what he could get. When the peasantry reiterated their initial 
position rather than conceding and the king’s agents presented him with the reality that 
his opening negotiating position of 1,200 men could not be achieved at a ratio of two 
farms per soldier, the very thing he repudiated, the king chose stability over the number 
of soldiers.
201
 Twice the king would declare for numbers that he would not get, offering 
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concession after concession to move the peasantry towards his position.
202
 This was a 
process of Karl XI trying to convince the peasantry, but as with any negotiation, the king 
stated hard positions and offered concessions to see what the peasantry would be willing 
to give up. Throughout the process of dialog, the king was using negotiation and 
negotiating tactics, positions and concessions, to pursue his real goals. To push the 
peasantry to see what the real resources actually were to base the system’s stability on.   
Karl XI was actively negotiating with the peasantry, putting forth his higher 
standard to see if the peasantry would bend towards him. His opening position was 
explicitly that he did not want two farms for each soldier if it meant a reduction in the 
number of soldiers. Nevertheless, when that ploy, his initial offer, did not produce the 
desired response it was actually the position that he rejected that he would finally adopt. 
Karl XI had opened with a high negotiating position, but through the insights gained from 
peasant opinion and information from his agents into the real conditions of the provinces, 
the king modified his negotiating position to align more with each locality. 
In the negotiations over the number of soldiers Småland would support in each of 
its three regiments, the king established strong negotiating positions to test the peasantry, 
but ultimately compromised. Karl XI adapted to the conditions of the locality to ensure a 
steady supply of manpower over an inconsistent but larger one. He compromised his core 
goal of 1,200 men per regiment, and across the three regiments lost 300 soldiers. In the 
case of Kalmar län, the king’s initial negotiating position of 1,200 men stands in stark 
contrast to the 347 men he ended up agreeing to. His negotiating tactics tested what the 
peasantry was willing or able to give up, the real resources of the two counties. Karl XI 
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incorporated this information and modified his negotiating positions to account for it, all 
the while maintaining a hard bargaining line to push the peasantry for the best results 
within the picture he developed of the real resources of Småland. He used negotiation to 
find the balance point where he could get the most out of the province while keeping the 
system reliable. Finding this balancing point, however, did not always necessitate the 
king compromising on his primary goal of acquiring a certain number of soldiers, as was 





The Size of a Regiment in Finland: A Long Path to Success 
 
The negotiation of the knekthåll contracts for Finland was a long process, far 
longer than the rest of the negotiations during the reign of Karl XI. These negotiations, 
unlike those of Småland, resulted in the king achieving his overall goal for the number of 
soldiers, but not in the manner that he initially was pushing for. He convinced the 
peasantry in the three Finnish counties to support his six thousand man goal for Finland, 
but did not achieve the distribution between the counties he set out at the beginning of the 
negotiations. In so many of the other knekthåll contract negotiations the king failed to 
achieve the goals he expressed at the opening of the negotiations, be it in allowing a lega 
or the reduction of soldier payment obligations. But in Finland the king used negotiation 
to achieve his overall numbers goal, but not his specific initial goal. 
Within six months after Karl XI gave permission to the commission in Småland to 
reduce the number of soldiers in each of the three regiments in the province, the king 
himself broached the same topic with the governor of Åbo och Björneborg län in 
Finland.
203
 The governor had informed the king that the peasantry in the county had
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expressed their desire and willingness to come under the knekthåll. The peasantry had 
further indicated that they wished to include in the system ödes-hemman (abandoned 
farms) that were in the county. To which the king declared that he found it both 
beneficial and necessary to include the abandoned farms, and instructed the governor to 
rehabilitate them. The rational for this, as well as Karl XI’s following negotiating 
instructions to the governor, was the depletion of the county from crop failure.
204
 
Furthermore, that it was “wise and indispensable” that the division of farms into rotas be 
adapted and made suitable after the area’s nature and ability.
205
 At this point, Karl XI 
moved from explaining his thinking to instructing the governor on how he was to proceed 
in the negotiations. The governor was to first present to the peasantry that it was the 
king’s will that each regiment contain one thousand men, and if they provided that 
number the king would leave it to the peasantry to come together as best they could as to 
the division of farms into rotas. To that end, the king then instructed the governor to 
provide the peasantry with arguments and proposals.
206
  
However, the king stated, should they not believe they could remain in good 
condition and maintain one thousand men, the governor was to reassure them with more 
favorable conditions.
207
 At that juncture, the governor should write to the king and 
request that he lower the number of men in each regiment to eight hundred. Karl XI 
specifically ordered the governor not to let the peasantry on to his openness to a lower 
number. This was so that the governor could ascertain from the peasantry if the one 
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thousand men per regiment number was even feasible and could happen with some stock 
and security. Only after some time, if the number did not seem workable, was the 
governor to introduce the reduced eight-hundred man figure.
208
    
The negotiations in Finland took a lot longer to come to fruition than the rest of 
the kingdom. In June 1692, Karl XI was still discussing with the Finnish governors how 
to get one thousand men in each of the six Finnish regiments.
209
 The governors 
collectively had been deliberating on how, and in what way, they could best meet the 
king’s goals. In response to the governors’ letter concerning their difficulties, the king 
expressed his understanding of the difficulties they faced. The number of farms available 
in each of the counties was not sufficient, even with abandoned farms factored in.
210
  
Quality of the individual farms was also a concern. In Åbo and Nyland, the farms 
did not appear strong enough to the king to maintain reliably a soldier on only the ratio of 
two farms per soldier. Småland’s similar weakness in farm quality contributed to a 
number of concessions to align the province more closely with the stable two farms per 
one soldier ratio. However, in Finland this ratio was not enough to maintain consistency. 
The governor of Viborg och Nyslott län as well had made apparent to the king the 
weakness of the already established rotas in the county. This could lead to acts of protest 
among the peasantry. Due to the geographic location of the county, the peasantry could 
easily move to areas exempt from the knekthåll. Consequently, the governor had 
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As the king still considered it his intention to get a consistent six thousand men 
out of the Finnish counties, he presented two points. The first was a directive to the 
governors of Åbo and Nyland to implement a previous proposal to transfer some of the 
parishes that were supporting the navy into the knekthåll system.
212
 Second, for the relief 
of the peasantry the king took upon himself the responsibility of paying the soldier’s 
annual salary.
213
   
The glacial pace of the negotiations in Finland led to reiterations of the same basic 
points repeatedly, namely the king directing the governors to work out how to get the full 
six thousand men. How to attain this number was an ongoing predicament that was not 
easily resolved. To this end in a letter to the governors of Finland, Karl XI again charged 
them to work together to find the six thousand soldiers, but this time directed them to be 
more flexible in the distribution of the burden.
214
 All three of the governors were to work 
together, step by step, and carefully discuss how to achieve the king’s goal in a manner 
both to the king’s greatest security, but also so that the peasantry all over Finland would 
have the same burden. Accordingly, each of the three counties should not maintain 
exactly two thousand men, because one of the counties was stronger than the other two 
                                                             
211. Ibid, 92. 
 
212. Ibid, 92. 
 
213. Ibid, 93. 
 
214. Karl XI to Landshövdingen Friherre Carl Bonde, September 1, 1692, in Kongl. stadgar, 
förordningar, bref och resolutioner, angående Swea rikes landt-milice til häst och fot 1680–1718, ed. 




and, with fewer difficulties, could raise over two thousand men itself.
215
 Karl XI then 
gave them detailed instructions on how they were to do this, again reiterating that, in 
carful discussion, they were to distribute the burden amongst the counties.216 Finally, the 
king reminded the governors not to let their feelings for their own county bias their work. 
He did not want them to favor their own county over the other two.
217
  
The king’s directive to distribute the burden across the counties, as well as his 
concession of providing the soldier’s salary, both came together in a letter to the governor 
of Åbo och Björneborg län in mid-1693.
218
 This letter was a response to individual 
reports from the governors of the three counties on the resources of their own and the 
other governors’ counties. With these reports, the king, after reiterating the numbers and 
details provided by the governors, estimated the number of soldiers each county should 
provide. Åbo och Björneborg län was to provide 2,200 men, which the king estimated 
that depending on the location in the county would be at a ratio of two or three farms per 
soldier. Karl XI went on to discuss tax changes in the county, and told the governor that 
for this reason when setting up the rotas he should consider the number of farms 
constituting the rota rather than their combined tax value.
219
  
As for the governor of Nyland och Tavastehus län the king believed that the 
county could not support his target of 2,040 soldiers, and that it did not appear to be able 
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to securely support more than 2,000 men.
220
 Though as the king then remarked, it was to 
the accomplishment of that goal that he had notified the peasantry he would assume the 
pay of the soldiers and provision of their uniforms. Karl XI concluded his comment to the 
governor with an observation on the quality of the farms in the county. The tax value of 
the land might not accurately reflect the real conditions of the land and farms. Therefore, 
the governor, similar to the governor of Åbo och Björneborg län, was to consider the 
farms themselves rather than their tax valuation.
221
  
To the governor of Viborg och Nyslott län the king addressed the division of 
farms into rotas that had already taken place. This had raised 1,480 men at a ratio of four 
farms supporting a single soldier. In consideration of the numbers provided to him in the 
governors’ reports, the king believed the county could raise 1,500 men at the same 
ratio.
222
 By changing the ratio to three farms supporting one soldier, the king proposed 
that he could attain his goal of two thousand men per county. Based on this the king 
directed the governor to suggest this ratio to the peasantry, and at the same time mention 
to them that their responsibility would only be for the soldier’s work clothing, as the king 
would provide the soldier’s salary. The king foresaw several issues, pointing out that the 
governor could find that the peasantry was likely to flee, or that the farms were too small, 
or even that the burden of providing a hundred men annually to repairing local 
fortifications was too great. If the governor learned that this was impossible and that the 
peasantry would be too weak at a ratio of three to one, then the king had another 
suggestion. He recommended that the governors together could make up this amount. If 
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the other two counties in Finland were to furnish 340 or 350 men, then Viborg och 
Nyslott län would only need to raise 1,600 or 1,650 soldiers. The other two governors, 




The king went on to provide the governor of Åbo och Björneborg län with 
detailed instructions and ideas on how to reach 2,200 men in his county. Covering issues 
such as the governor’s proposal for additional farms to bring into the system, providing 
the supplementary 340 to 350 soldiers to Viborg och Nyslott län, and how to deal with 
the peasantry’s burden of providing the soldier with food and pay for their travel to 
regimental training.
224
 This last concern was something that came up repeatedly in the 
discussions regarding the knekthåll in Finland. This was a burden that the rest of the 
kingdom did not have a problem with, but for relatively poor Finland it was a real 
concern.
225
 In this instance, Karl XI left the matter to the governor’s discretion, to deal 
with the peasantry’s burden as best suited to their conditions and prosperity.
226
 Lastly, 
after dealing with another detail, the king concluded by reiterating his desire for six 
thousand men to be raised across Finland in a manner that all three counties would share 
the burden in proportion to their size and conditions.
227
   
The negotiations over the number of soldiers that the Finnish counties were to 
provide started with a flexible negotiating position ready for tuning to the conditions of 
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the locality. Karl XI began the negotiations with an understanding of the weakness of the 
Finnish counties. In the case of Åbo och Björneborg län, the king discussed this 
weakness, but framed a second and distinctly separate goal. The king saw it as wise and 
indispensable that the system, specifically the rotas in this instance, be adapted to the 
characteristics and ability of the locality.
228
 The king then presented one of the methods 
by which he and his agents were to find this amount. Karl XI laid out to the governor 
very specific negotiating instructions. The governor was to present the king’s goal to the 
peasantry and try to convince them of it, using the process of dialog to get their opinions 
on the viability of the king’s objective. He was to propose to the peasantry a hard 
bargaining line with strong opening positions that would keep their opinions honest. By 
maintaining strong positions, the peasantry had to make stronger offers and arguments to 
sway the king. Thus, Karl XI’s anchored stance continually tested the limits of what the 
peasantry was willing to part with. As the king’s agent argued, the peasantry in return had 
to provide counter arguments, and thus information and opinion. If the peasantry did not 
believe the king’s numbers were possible to maintain in a reliable manner, then and only 
then was the governor to offer them a lower number. The king then reiterated the same 
things that he had said previously.
229
 He explicitly instructed the governor not to concede 
ground on his own, but to listen and use the dialog to determine if the goal was feasible 
and would remain stable. He was not to hint to the peasantry that the king was open to a 
lower possible number specifically because the king wanted to “see” what was actually 
possible. 
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Karl XI was actively using the process of negotiation as an intelligence gathering 
tool. The governor, in the midst of very specific and detailed negotiation instructions was 
to use these talks as an instrument for gaining the knowledge to ascertain the ability of 
the locality to achieve the king’s initial negotiating position, their real resources. It was 
more than just the ability to achieve the number Karl XI was after however. The directive 
to the governor was not just about the flexibility of the king’s number, but specifically if 
the peasantry could maintain it with security.
230
 Finally, if Karl XI achieved his numbers 
then he left the details free for the peasantry to decide themselves. This was both a carrot 
to pull the peasantry towards his position, but also an acknowledgment that the goal of 
the local adaptation was to accomplish his desired numbers in a manner that reliably 
maintained the regiment.  
In later communications with the governors concerning the negotiations in 
Finland, the king continued to use negotiations for the purpose of local adaptation. For 
instance, the king’s evolving directive to distribute the burden of the six thousand soldiers 
across the three counties. In his earlier comments on the topic, Karl XI was non-specific 
about how the governors were to do this. His directive to the governors told them to work 
together to attain the king’s number in a manner that equalized the burden and best 
served the king’s security.
231
 The whole of Finland thus became like Småland and 
Västergötland, where the division of the total numbers of an area was by their ability to 
maintain reliably the soldiers rather than by geographic boundaries. 
When Karl XI touched on this same issue later, this time with more specifics, he 
had clear suggestions that exposed the degree to which he was willing to adapt the 
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numbers to the locality. Both Åbo och Björneborg län and Nyland och Tavastehus län 
were to contribute more soldiers, to equalize the contribution of the weaker Viborg och 
Nyslott län.
232
 As the king discussed these numbers with the governors, he brought up the 
various concessions he had already made in terms of the soldier’s payment. He 
specifically reaffirmed that he was going to provide the soldier’s salary and uniform. The 
king had instructed the governor of Viborg och Nyslott län, to bring his suggestion to the 
peasantry in context of his previous concession.
233
 The governors were to take the king’s 
suggested numbers, present them to the peasantry, and negotiate towards their fulfillment. 
To that end, Karl XI had provided his agents with an argument to make: to point out that 
the king had already conceded in many areas. Like the king’s letter in August 1684, the 
king told one of the governors to bring a number to the peasantry with points to support 
it, and learn from them if the number would work or not, considering the difficulties he 
foresaw in the locality. Karl XI adapted his numbers to the nature of the locality and 
tested them with negotiations. 
The negotiations over the number of soldiers supported in Finland concluded with 
the burden distributed amongst the counties, although in different amounts than the 
king’s earlier suggestions. In response to the draft contract for Nyland och Tavastehus 
län, the king provided certain modified clauses the governor was to insert into the final 
version of the contract. One of these clauses contained the final agreed upon number of 
soldiers the county was to support, 2,050 men, and as previously recommended the 
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governor had calculated this based on the number of farms.
234
 This was the same for Åbo 
och Björneborg län, but conversely, the final number Viborg och Nyslott län agreed to 
support was only 1,908 men. Within Viborg och Nyslott län there was a further 
subdivision of the obligation, with Viborg providing 1,033 men of that total, and Nyslott 
the remaining 875.
235
 These numbers total to slightly over the six thousand soldiers that 
the king desired. Karl XI had made substantial concessions in terms of the soldier’s 
payment, but had achieved his primary goal in the negotiations.   
The most substantial differentiation between these numbers and the earlier 
discussed proposals by the king was in the case of Åbo och Björneborg län, with a 
reduction of 150 men. Viborg och Nyslott län had an increase of 308 to 258 from the 
king’s proposed numbers of 1,600 to 1,650 for the county to raise. The increased burden 
in Viborg och Nyslott län was the most substantial of the three counties. Neither 
Kamppinen nor Ågren provide any sort of explanation for this increase. It is possible that 
the rehabilitation of abandoned farms had something to do with this as Viborg och 
Nyslott län had almost four times the number of abandoned farms compared to the other 
counties in 1692.
236
 The change in Åbo och Björneborg län was also significant 
considering Karl XI’s insistence on the previous number. This new total, however, 
aligned with the minor increase in the burden on Nyland och Tavastehus län, equalizing 
the numbers between the two. Considering the king’s penchant for creating similarity 
between areas, this could be a contributing factor, though considering the decrease there 
were probably other factors at play. 
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As for the number of soldiers other areas in the kingdom of Sweden agreed to 
provide, only Västerbotten negotiated a lower sum of 1,056 men. This was because the 
province lacked the manpower to raise 1,200 men and the governor believed it would 
cause damage if they tried. Therefore, Karl XI decided to continue to use the number of 
soldiers the province had agreed upon for its regiment with Queen Christina.
237
 The 
counties of Västergötland and Dalsland, Älvsborg län and Skaraborg län, had also 
negotiated a slightly different set of obligations than the other provinces. Älvsborg län 
had to raise its own regiment of 1,200 men as well as the Västgöta-Dals regiment, which, 
in the final contract, it supplied seventy-five percent of the soldiers, with the remaining 
300 provided by the other county in Västergötland, Skaraborg län.
238
 Overall, Karl XI 
had negotiated his desired number for each regiment in all but four of the regiments, 
sacrificing a total of 444 men between them. 
Karl XI was able to achieve his objective for the number of soldiers in Finland. 
Where in Småland Karl XI started out asking Kalmar län for 1,200 men and ended up 
with 347, in Finland the king began by asking for 6,000 men from the whole of Finland 
and received that number. The king negotiated his desired overall number but did so via 
distributing the burden across the three counties according to his information on their 
relative strength. By adapting to the comparative strength of the counties, Karl XI was 
able to more closely accord with the real resources revealed with his strategic use of 
negotiation and from his local experts. In these negotiations, the king was flexible to the 
information he received, and was able to use that to both achieve his objective for the 
                                                             
237. Karl XI to General Major and Landshövdingen Fri-Herre Hans Ab. Kruse, April 27, 1685, in 
Kongl. stadgar, förordningar, bref och resolutioner, angående Swea rikes landt-milice til häst och fot 
1680–1718, ed. Sigfrid L. Gahm Persson (Stockholm, 1762), 1:527. 
 




number of soldiers while assuring his greater goal, that the system remain stable over the 
long term. By organizing this stable and dependable knekthåll system Karl XI had moved 
another step down the road of insuring his successors did not have to deal with the same 






The reign of Karl XI was one of reform. When he ascended to the throne, he 
found a state that was only financially solvent when bolstered by the spoils of war. 
Sweden was poor, not as poor as it had once been before the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, 
but still poor when compared to the other European powers of the age. Karl XI, to 
maintain his kingdom, had to develop “new” systems, organizations, and methods of 
resource extraction to stabilize his state’s finances. The indelningsverk not only gave 
Sweden an inexpensive army, but one that was well trained and highly motivated. 
The revealed intentions of Karl XI, from his actions in the negotiations to his 
stated goals and objectives in his discussions with his agents and the peasantry, follow 
the lessons of the Scanian War. In that war, the old systems that had powered the 
Swedish war-machine since the Thirty Years’ War had failed to deliver. Karl XI spent the 
first years of his reign on the precipice of disaster, bailed out in the end by a foreign 
power and not the might of Swedish arms.  
To rectify these failures Karl XI set out to rebuild the Swedish war-making 
apparatus where it had failed, in its resource acquisition mechanisms. From a bankrupt 
state, the king overhauled its fiscal foundations, leaving his successor in the black. He 
transformed the utskrivning and the other older systems of recruitment. Old building 
blocks turned towards a sustainable and reliable structure that assured Karl XI that his 




In terms of the knekthåll, this transformation came out of negotiations. Karl XI, 
the first absolutist monarch of Sweden, with undisputed power over lawmaking and 
taxation, actively negotiated with the peasantry. When the king first opened negotiations 
with various minor localities in Älvsborg län, he called upon the peasantry and the local 
governor to negotiate their entrance into the knekthåll system. The king, in his dialog 
with the peasantry and his own agents, formulated negotiating tactics. He instructed his 
agents to bring arguments and negotiating positions to the peasantry, and, when the 
peasantry refused his objectives, the king modified his negotiating positions, made 
concessions, and reformulated new arguments. Like with any negotiation he would take 
what he could get, but if there was resistance, the king would make concessions and 
continue to work to build consensus with the peasantry. 
 From the standards set in the Riksdag contract by the king in agreement with the 
peasantry in five of the provinces, Karl XI had made real and significant concessions. 
Every single province negotiated an allowance for them to pay a lega, something that the 
Riksdag contract had strongly forbidden. This lega was not the lega of old, whose ability 
to bankrupt the peasantry had disrupted both military recruitment and taxation. Karl XI 
had put a cap on the lega to keep it from getting out of hand, dampening its negatives 
severely while giving the peasantry what they wanted. In terms of the soldier’s payment, 
there was flexibility as well. Every single province that negotiated its contract with Karl 
XI after the Riksdag of 1682 had a reduction in obligations, with several not having to 
pay the soldier’s salary at all.  
 This flexibility had a more specific intention behind it than merely building 




them to adapt the knekthåll to the localities’ nature, characteristics, and ability. In the 
letter of January 24, 1684 to the governor of Jönköping och Kronoberg län, the king 
attached copies of his discussions with the commissions in Uppland and Västergötland. 
From these documents, the king told the governor he could discern the king’s intention, 
and with that, the governor could adapt the knekthåll and make it suitable with the place’s 
attributes and character.
239
 The king would set requirements and goals, but was generally 
indifferent on the specific details of achieving them within the established knekthåll 
framework: he allowed the details to conform to what worked in the individual locality.  
 Adapting to local requests and conditions allowed the king to align the system 
with the reality of the locality and create a more stable system. In Småland and Finland 
the king modified the maximum lega into substantially different directions from the norm 
established in the other provinces. Despite both provinces’ similar weakness compared to 
the rest of the kingdom, Karl XI adjusted to both numbers by request of either the 
peasantry or the king’s local agent. The king also adjusted the number of soldiers in 
different regiments, his most rigidly defined goal, to more accord with the negotiations. 
The three counties of Småland each had their regiment size reduced when the king 
realized that the peasantry could not maintain reliably his original goal. Kalmar län, out 
of an initial demand for 1,200 men ended up only supporting 347.
240
 Finland, on the other 
hand did not negotiate an overall reduction in the number of soldiers the king wanted 
them to provide. What did happen, however, was that the king had proportionally spread 
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the burden across the different counties. The burden overall was adapted to local 
conditions. It was not just the end results where flexibility and local adaptation were 
evident, the chains of negotiation themselves were a constant process of concessions and 
adaptation.  
 In adapting to these local conditions, the king showed a constant preference for 
stability over any other goal. Where the king would trade concessions on the salary to 
help bring the peasantry around to his position on the number of soldiers, he would trade 
this goal of attaining a certain number of soldiers for stability. In spite of the king’s clear 
insistence that he was willing to sacrifice the two farms supporting one soldier ratio in 
Kalmar län to get the number of soldiers he desired, he chose the far lower, but 
sustainable, number. A stable and reliable system was for Karl XI a central objective in 
setting up the knekthåll. He did not want the issues of the Scanian War to happen again. 
Karl XI set the knekthåll on firm foundations, a system consistent in function and aligned 
with real local conditions and abilities.  
 Furthering this stability was the method used to achieve it, negotiation. By 
utilizing the old Swedish tradition of dialog and consensus building and working with the 
peasantry in constructing the knekthåll, the king legitimized his system. Jan Lindegren 
points to this sort of participation as granting legitimacy and via this legitimacy, he 
argues, the Swedish state was able to extract a disproportionate amount of resources from 
the population when compared to other European states.
241
 By negotiating the bigger 
aspects of the system and leaving the details, even some important ones, up to the 
peasantry, the king brought the peasantry into a discourse that legitimized the knekthåll 
and placed it on a basis of consensus rather than coercion.  
                                                             




 The value of negotiation as a tool was far more than its ability to build consensus. 
To adapt to an area the king first had to have information on the locality. In the dialog 
with his agents and the peasantry, Karl XI used negotiation as a tool to measure the real 
resources of an area. The king made proposals and established negotiating positions from 
which he would test the peasantry. He would make offers and they would return with 
counter-offers, and from this the king gained information. In this dialog, the king would 
instruct his agents to listen and assess the peasantry’s thoughts and opinions. The push-
and-pull of negotiations served to optimize the resource extraction of the state. 
 From an economics perspective, Karl XI was using negotiation to acquire 
distributed knowledge. Negotiation acted as an instrument to gain the information to 
create an optimized system. The knekthåll system itself was a mechanism for the 
acquisition of dispersed societal knowledge for the state resource gathering apparatus. 
With its delegation of recruitment and maintenance to the local level, the farmer became 
a military entrepreneur in service of the Swedish state. In part, Parrott’s argument about 
decentralization forwarding the power of the state, considered in this economics 
perspective, is a process of the state accessing previously unattainable knowledge and 
incentive networks for its own benefit.
242
  
In the process of this discussion, the king’s agents were at work assessing the 
situation and making proposals. These agents provided more than just information, but 
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also personal judgments and opinion. They were local experts on the areas involved and 
the people actively engaged in negotiation, the king’s men with the closest perspective of 
the veracity of the peasants’ negotiating tactics and positions. The king tapped into this 
additional source of knowledge: he actively listened to these experts and followed their 
advice.
243
 Karl XI was in dialog not just with the peasantry, but a panel of experts that 
could help him attune to the appropriate negotiating points to access the legitimization 
and specific local knowledge of the peasantry. 
 Out of this process of dialog and negotiations, in the actions and words of the 
king, he had two intentions. The first was the king’s intention to negotiate. The king was 
an active participant in the negotiations, both to attain his goal and to find information. 
Whatever his power to simply command obedience, his dialog with his agents shows him 
pushing them towards negotiations and guiding them to achieve his ends. The second was 
the king’s explicitly stated intention for local adaptation. Repeatedly, the king in action 
and instructions modified the knekthåll towards local conditions. In doing so, the king 
built a more stable and smooth functioning system over the long term. He used 
negotiation to discover an area’s real resources and adapted to these local conditions, all 
the while the mechanism of negotiation was acting to legitimize. 
Karl XI continued the practice of his predecessors, using consensus building and 
cooperation over coercion as a mechanism to overcome the kingdom’s poverty. As 
previous kings had used dialog and negotiation to legitimize and adapt to diverse local 
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Sweden and in Europe during the 17th Century,” in Europe and Scandinavia: Aspects of the Process of 
Integration in the 17th Century, ed. Göran Rystad (Lund: Wallin & Dalholm Boktr AB, 1983), 71-94. 
Åberg argued that Karl XI was indecisive and easily influenced by these experts. Rystad, on the other hand, 
contends that Karl XI was not pliable and, rather, any outside influence was a controlled part of the king’s 




situations, so too had Karl XI. The two intentions of Karl XI, to negotiate and to adapt to 
the circumstances of individual localities, were in the king’s actions one singular process. 
The king sought stability and reliability, long-term efficiency in his mechanisms of 
resource extraction. Karl XI utilized the properties of the tool that was negotiation to 
achieve his goals, choosing the unique benefits of a cooperative solution. He chose 
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utveckling från äldsta tider. Stockholm: Militärlitteratur-föreningens förlag, 1883. 
 
Frost, Robert I. The Northern Wars 1558-1721: War, State and Society in Northeastern 
Europe, 1558-1721. Harlow: Longman, 2000. 
 
Fynn-Paul, Jeff, ed. War, Entrepreneurs and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 
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